Sunday, July 14, 2013

German Nationalism in the Early 19th Century - A Historiography

Well, nationalism is in the news again particularly as folks on the right get tired of blind nationalism trumping
what it means for us to be Americans... that our particular brand of nationalism is based upon a common inheritance of freedom and personal liberty provided for by God and that our government was installed to protect it.  Well, it used to be.  Now, nationalism is a topic of discussion because many see parallels in our current slide into statism as with what happened in the years from 1848 to 1945.  So, for my 18th and 19th history class, I've decided to take a look at the historiography of nationalism, particularly in Germany in the early 19th century.

OK, for those of you interested in the subject, read on... For those not.  Oh well.


Nationalism, liberalism, and socialism are the three competitive ideologies that came of age in Europe during the long nineteenth century.  All three are inextricably tied to the development of the modern era and every modern nation-state had elements of each in its creation, formation, and maturation.  This essay examines nationalism in general but focuses in particular on the historiography of the dawn of nationalism in the German states up unto the mid nineteenth century.  While this essay certainly cannot purport to be an exhaustive survey of the history of the time, efforts have been made to narrow the survey to the major contributors to the study of nationalism and historians with concentrations in modern German history.
Due to its relative youth, nationalism as a topic for study only started near the end of the nineteenth century.  The rise of nation states and associated nationalist movements that focused on ethnicity, common languages and cultures, and patriotism necessitated scholarly interest in this development.  At the outset and due to the close chronological proximity, the study of nationalism had a very positive tone. But following the Great War, the study of nationalism took a much more sinister one as conventional thought casted the blame of the carnage at the feet of the inspirers of nationalist fanaticism rather than at the diplomats who failed in their brinksmanship.  The fanatical return to a cult-like, romantic nationalism manipulated by Hitler and the National Socialists severely altered the study of nationalism from the 1930s until the end of the Cold War.  In the immediate aftermath of the horrors of Nazism, historians studied the subject to attempt to explain what went wrong between 1939 and 1945.
After the Iron Curtain descended across Europe, Marxist interpretations of nationalism took a long view of the subject, relegating it to tumultuous crises of modernity or a tool used by capitalist elites to control the workers of the world.  Serious scholarship of the issue practically ceased and works on the topic were shoehorned into the Marxist narrative.
When the cracks in the Marxist system appeared in the inability of the nebulous, international socialist ideology to transcend the differences highlighted by nationalism, the studiers of nationalism zoomed out the lens from just Germany to focus on areas of the world that showed similarities.  The total collapse of the international socialists with the fall of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the abandonment of socialism in the Warsaw Pact, and the Nazi-like ethnic violence that ripped apart the Balkans deservedly drew historians’ focus away from the Third Reich to a broader historiography of the topic.  Similarly, the use of nationalism in other parts of the world, notably anti-colonial nationalism in Africa, pan-Arabism in the 1970s and 1980s, and rifts between socialist nations like China, Vietnam, and Soviet states highlighted the need to broaden the topic.

Friedrich Meinecke – The First Nationalist Historian

The first historian of note to deal with the subject of nationalism in Germany was the venerable Friedrich Meinecke whose Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat[1] was the first in-depth look at the creation of the Second Reich.  Not only was Meincke a historian studying nationalism, he could also be considered an historian who was also a nationalist.  Because of his nationalist perspective and the fact he was a historian, Meinecke can be considered, by default, the first nationalist historian.  In Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, he glowingly explores the intellectual and philosophical founders of German nationalism and traces connections with the political movements that forged the sentiment into the Prussian-dominated state in the late 1800s.  Meinecke devotes considerable attention to the struggle between the liberal nationalists attempt to pull Prussia into an federalist union as a state amongst equals and the Prussian Junker successful effort to draw in the German states under its hegemony.[2]
For obvious historical reasons, Meinecke’s positive perspective of nationalism was challenged by the defeat in the Great War and fairly obliterated by the Second World War.  Meinecke re-examined his perspective and sought to explain the catastrophe by applying the blame solely to the rise of Nazism while neglecting the roots behind it.[3]

Carlton J. H. Hayes – The Father of Nationalism

Carlton J. H. Hayes is widely regarded as the founder of the study of nationalism.  A professor of history at Columbia University from 1910 until 1950, Hayes influenced many historians.  In Essays on Nationalism, Hayes, at the outset, recognizes the difficulty in studying nationalism as it is subject to “deep and powerful emotions” and
touches all manner of current popular prejudices – personal, national, religious, and racial – and he who would expose the mainsprings of nationalist thought and action must guard particularly against his own emotional bias and at the same time face courageously the distrust and opposition of a large number of his fellows whose own manifold prejudices are enshrined in a collective herd-prejudice.[4]

In keeping with his self-administered warning to gently tread on the subject, and after defining nationality as a distinct and separate entity from “nation”, Hayes delicately states that nationality, in addition to observable, recognizable commonalities, may also be a shared consciousness.[5] With this careful definition of nationality, Hayes goes on to explain nationalism is a very modern phenomenon and fused nationality with patriotism; creating a higher loyalty than one’s self.  Similarly to Meinecke, Hayes traces the intellectual and philosophical beginnings of nationalist sentiment to romantic Germans such as Herder and Schlegel.[6]
One theme Hayes develops is nationalism as a religion.  He demonstrates in the continuity of history that humans are predisposed to serving something or someone.  This may be one’s family, tribe, culture, religion, or state.  But while many have likened the appeal of nationalist emotion to that of religious devotion, Hayes explores this in the context of the systematic, ‘enlightened’ destruction of Christian tradition, scholarship, and world-view.  Even while denigrating the established beliefs of the church, the attackers of faith traditions demonstrate a faith unto themselves:
Most of them got excited about a God of Nature who started things which he could not stop and who was so intent upon watching numberless worlds go round in their appointed orbits and so transfixed by the operation of all the eternal immutable Laws which he had invented that he had no time or ear for the little entreaties of puny men upon a pygmy Earth.  This God of Nature was obviously not much of a person and not much of a power; he was only a fraction of the God of the Christians. … They praised him with a voice so loud that he would have heard them if he could have heard anyone, and with a voice so awed that it betrayed the religious fervor which moved them.[7]

Hayes’ obvious disdain for hypocrisy aside, he goes on to show the various other utopian humanist beliefs developed during this period requiring just as much faith as to believe in the equal humanity and divinity of Christ.[8]  Among these, Hayes shows the worship of the state as a very real phenomenon maintaining similar tenants and rituals as that of organized religion.
The key to understanding Hayes’ significant contribution to this historiography is the context in which he wrote it.  Hayes devoted much of his life’s work to exploring the history of the nineteenth century through the lens of the horrors of 1914 through 1918.  Hayes delves into themes of militarism and nationalism, intolerance, and understandably has a negative view of the subject in general.
1931 saw a Hayes student, Robert R. Ergang publish a look at the contribution of Johann Gottfried Herder to the cultural impetus of the German nationalist movement.  An inspirer of individuals like Hegel, Goethe, Schlegel, and Fichte,[9] Herder believed culture to be a collective quality rather than an individual possession.[10]  Ergang concentrated most on Herder’s exploration of language as the most important commonality of the German people.
In 1934, Koppel S. Pinson, a Jewish emigrant historian was inspired by Hayes to explore the close connection between piety and nationalism in Germany.  Pinson showed that “certain intellectual, psychological, and emotional reactions engendered and developed within the religious sphere of Pietism, came in the course of time to be transferred to the realm of nationalism and nationality.”[11]  Pietism brought into eighteenth-century Germany an emotionalism and enthusiasm which were hitherto lacking.  This provided the emotional basis for the subsequent nationalism.”[12]  He did not attempt to attribute the rise of nationalism solely to personal and emotional faith, but maintained it to be a factor.

The Post-War Era: Kohn, Snyder, and Pflanze

If Hayes can be considered the father of nationalism, Hans Kohn would be the number one contender for that title.  Kohn wrote extensively on the subject of nationalism, particularly German nationalism between 1940s and 1960s.  Personal experience deeply influenced his historical perspective.  A German Jew born in Prague at the close of the nineteenth century, Kohn came of age with an outside, but still close perspective of the negative consequences of radical nationalism.[13]  A cultural Zionist, as opposed to the political Zionism advocated by Theodore Herzl, Kohn focused on the subject of nationalism most of his life.  With such a biography, it seems odd that Kohn would argue for a more nuanced, understanding view of nationalism when the prevailing opinion of the armchair historian upon the discovery of the horrors of Nazism was, as Charles Beard wrote, “Nationalism equals war. War equals evil. Therefore nationalism must and will be extirpated.”[14]
Kohn’s wrote his first seminal work on the topic, The Idea of Nationalism[15], in the waning years of the Second World War.  According to Kohn the conventional wisdom of the time attributed nationalism to “fictitious concepts which have been accepted as having real substance.  One holds that blood or race is the basis of nationality, and that it exists externally and carries with it an unchangeable inheritance; the other sees the Volkgeist as an ever-welling source of nationality and all its manifestations.”[16]  Kohn explains there can be no such simplistic understanding of nationality but attributes the concept to a unique combination of the following factors: “common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion.”[17]
In Prelude to Nation-States[18], Kohn explains the development of the nation state, with particular emphasis on the French and German models from the Revolution to the end of the Napoleonic wars.  To Kohn, the concept of the nation as a singular, distinct political and cultural entity is a modern development that saw its root in the Enlightenment, the collapse of the ancien régime in France, and reaction toward Napoleonic aggression at the beginning of the long century.  Kohn sees three distinct paths to nation-hood: the Anglo-American model[19], the French, and the German.  The first was marked by a melding of tradition with enlightenment values; a conservative liberty with emphasis on shared ideals and values rather than simple ethnicity and language.  The second was the volatile, extremist, overboard rejection of the past in which the Jacobin terror and the rise of Napoleon were the inevitable outcomes of such a radical break in tradition.  This mode was marked by an ideology of the collective and exchanged the blind devotion toward the church for a fanaticism for the state.  Kohn states the third mode, the German model, was a strange mixture of contemporary geopolitical realities that was animated by the reactions to the Napoleonic invasions and occupations.  These geopolitical variables included the ongoing fragmentation of the hegemony of Austria in central Europe; the ascendency of Prussia to fill that void; the fusing of a shared German culture, language, and literature; and the rise of romanticism.
Kohn’s contemporary, Louis L. Snyder, a professor of history at the City College of New York explored the topic of nationalism to probably an even greater extent than Kohn.  Snyder chose to concentrate nearly exclusively on the German model of nationalism.  One of his first works on the subject, German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People[20], published in 1952, is a mature look at the totality of the subject from its beginnings to the immediate post-war timeframe.  In explaining the vacuum left either by the fall of the feudal system and accompanying monarchies, or by the threatened fall of established powers, Snyder contrasts the “twin current[s]” guiding those changes; that of liberalism and nationalism.  Liberalism “rejects any restraints upon the freedom on this individual, repudiates any tyranny which would interfere with the right of freedom of conscience or of social or intellectual liberty … and, in general, seeks to enlarge the area in which the human spirit is free to voyage in self-discovery,” while nationalism looks upon the state as the grantor and guarantor of freedoms and serves as the individual’s object of uttermost allegiance.[21]
Snyder explained the differences in outcomes of the French and British models as contrasted with the German as the inability of German nationalism to successfully marry these two streams into one in its own struggle for modernity.  The intellectuals and advocates of the aufklärung gained no traction in the common people as the French Revolution appeared across the Rhine.  It took the invasion of Napoleon to provide the purchase for the feet of those determined to bring to life a romantic vision of a powerful German state.  Lamentably, to Snyder, the emergence of Prussia as the opportunistic driver ensured an ambitious monarch would take the reins of the newly birthed sentiment.
Of course Snyder does not rely on so simplistic a cause.  In his later books on the subject, he attributes the origins of German nationalism to the eccentricity and duality of the German character; the turning to romanticism in response to the demoralizing occupation of Napoleon, the common education in German cultural values through the Brothers Grimms’ Hausmärchen, the binding together the economies through the Zollverein, and the cult of militarism among others.[22] [23]
Snyder also broadened the focus from Germany in particular to nationalism in general, defining the word in The Meaning of Nationalism.[24]  In it, he admits the concept and understanding of nationalism is so nebulous that he advocates a multi-disciplinary approach; drawing particular definitions from geography, psychiatry, linguistics, religion, political science, psychology, philosophy, sociology, and psychoanalysis.  He expands on the subject by applying the multidiscipline definitions upon nationalism’s various manifestations.
Snyder and Kohn’s contemporary Otto Pflanze showed the Prussian utilitarianism in the use of nationalism in the struggle to gain the upper hand over Austria in its dominance in central Europe.  Bismarck shrewdly understood the awesome potential nationalist sentiment tied to Prussian power.  In Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification 1815–71,[25] Pflanze argues Bismarck opportunistically used liberal tenants to pacify those still clamoring for change, thus neutering the liberals, while offering pride through military might and nationalist fervor.

Marxist History

The 1960s and 1970s saw the height of the Marxist historians on the subject.  For the most part, they tended to downplay the importance of nationalism due to the perceived preeminence class struggle maintains over all.  The transcendence of Marxist theory over all else impacted the intellectual effort Marxist historians devoted toward it.  The 1960s saw Hobsbawm’s The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 and the development of his dual revolution theory, which while important to the field, did not address nationalism to the extent of his predecessors. In 1970, Brown professor Norman Rich myopically gushed over the Marxist history while casually dismissing nationalism as a side-topic confined to the nineteenth century. Rich claimed that while nationalism was once destructive and formidable, it could no longer overcome ideological divides like in divided Germany.[26]  Abraham Ashkenasi’s Modern German Nationalism[27] formulaically laid the blame for the development of nationalism upon “atavistic elite groups”[28] and went on to explain contemporary East-West German relations through that perspective. While not a study of nineteenth century nationalism, Richard J. Evans in Rethinking German History attributes the calamity of the Third Reich not to rigid submission to authority but to the stressors brought about by radical social changes.[29]

Post-Marxist History

In 1983, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism[30], a work written on the heels of the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam, explored the topic of nationalism at the beginning of the end of the Marxist school of thought. That incident and the Russo-Sino split questioned the Marxist narrative of the preeminence of the ideology over nationalism.  In the book Anderson argues that “nationality … as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind” and that “the creation of these artifacts towards the end of the eighteenth century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex ‘crossing’ of discrete historical forces.”[31]  Echoing Hayes’s concept of the perception of nationality, he postulated that the nation “is an imagined community”, quoting Ernest Gellner, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.”[32]
Though Anderson presents a slightly varying definition of a nation, he does not stray too far from Snyder’s explanations for the origins of nationalist thought.  After exploring the explosion of the publishing industry in confluence with the Protestant Reformation in the German states, Anderson says “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community.”[33]  Similar to Snyder, Anderson also focuses on language as an important variable in the development of nationalist thought in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe.  What distinguishes Anderson’s analysis on this subject, though, is where he ties in the matter of “comparative history” in the use of translation of ancient and classical texts in the eighteenth century to demonstrate the value or even superiority of contemporary culture to the ancient.  At this point Anderson may be unintentionally describing the beginnings of romanticism within Europe.

Revisionist History

Historians like William O. Shanahan and Robert M. Berdahl in the 1970s and 1980s began to question the Meinecke narrative of German nationalism being attributable solely to shared cultural values as opposed to the French model founded upon political idealism.  While appreciating the sizable influence of a shared political perspective in the French experience, Berdahl and Shanahan contend the German path to nation-hood was not void of political impetus of a positive, or non-reactive, nature.  Berdahl begs the question of what spurred the shared cultural experience of the Germans into political reality.  “How did the ideas of the intellectual elite become the experience of the nation? … What happened between 1800 and 1848 that increased the appeal of nationalism as a political movement?”[34]  Berdahl discounts the sole accreditation of the last question to the Napoleonic wars by pointing out that there was still a clamoring for unification even after the expulsion of the French interlopers.[35]
Shanahan levies similar criticism by pointing to the Confederation of the Rhine of 1806 to 1813.  Rather than simply posing the question like Berdahl, Shanahan answers it by positing the various principalities of the Rhine capitalized on their commonalities, melding them in a utilitarian manner into a nationalist sentiment with which to maintain their own power and control the population.  Seizing on the issues of citizenship, secularism, and equality, the German princes used nationalism as a goad to move their subjects years before Bismarck capitalized on the sentiment to unify the Reich.  Because of the waves of revolution, “a new myth had to be devised that both explained and legitimized government … Nationalism proved to be the form of myth most suitable to the ideals and realities of that era.”[36]  Shanahan brings up another vital point in highlighting the deep chasm of religious differences that still split the German states, speculating if those differences between Lutheran and Catholic were indeed stronger than the pull of other cultural commonalities.[37]
In 1978, James J. Sheehan, a previous president of the American Historical Association and Stanford University Professor, devoted a book to the subject of German liberalism in the Nineteenth Century.[38] In this work, Sheehan expands on Kohn’s understanding of the different paths of nationalism in the Anglo-American, French, and German models and differs from Snyder’s complete divergence of liberalism and nationalism.  Sheehan claims liberalism as a political ideology was used by both conservative nationalists and progressives.  Sheehan bolsters his argument by defining liberalism as more than simple individualism, what we may call libertarianism in today’s climate; and more than the social construct Marxists attempt to impose upon the word.[39]  Instead Sheehan paints a comprehensive picture of liberalism in eighteenth and nineteenth century Germany that pits idealistic, progressive philosophers turned party operatives against Burke-like, utilitarian, conservative politicians seeking to use liberalism as a pacifier against social upheaval.  Sheehan notes both these intractable entities used nationalist language and imagery to pull the people along with them, but the inability of the progressive wing to unify prior to 1848 and their fragmented nature lost out to the Bismarck Blut und Eisen unification of Germany under Prussian political ‘liberalism.’
In 1990, while contributing to Themes in Modern European History: 1830-1890,[40] Cardiff University’s Bruce A. Haddock tied the origins of nationalism to discontent amongst the cultured and literate against the hegemony of French culture, language, and literature.  Haddock returns to explaining the cultural aspects of nationalism by pointing to Herder’s disdain for the French influence.  He makes the point that it was more a negative, reactionary movement than a positive, seamlessly tying this cultural impetus together Kohn’s political explanation for the reaction to the French invasion during the Napoleonic wars.[41] [42]
In 1992, Boston University professor Liah Greenfeld wrote a book challenging the pessimism and conventional thought on the subject.  In Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity[43], Greenfeld retells the rise of nationalism mostly by redefining the term.  She uses charts to graphically represent the various etymological shifts in definition of the nation and nationality over the years and arrives with a contemporary, more benign, and philosophical understanding of the term, linking nationalism to a democratic society as an idyllic end state.[44] [45]  In this redefining of the term, she almost joins Francis Fukuyama in presenting an end of nationalism within history.  She explores the paths of Germany, France, Britain, Russia, and the United States and their particular development of nationalism.  She bucks the established thought by maintaining Britain was the first nation in the modern sense of the word.  Critics of her scholarship have pointed out that byneglecting politics and state-making,” Greenfeld “tells only half of a story.”[46]
Helmut Walser Smith, a contemporary modern German historian, likens historiography to painting and uses the metaphor of the vanishing-point.  To a historian painting a picture of a period of history, the perspective of the eye of the artist defines how the picture will appear.  The entire composition has in common a singular vanishing point.  In his work The Continuities of German History,[47] Smith explains how this common vanishing point influences the entirety of various historians’ work on modern German history.  He describes how many of the German historians in the wake of 1945 used the defeat and the ascendency of National Socialism as the vanishing point that particularly influenced their understandings of the nineteenth Century.


Even though the schools of thought on the origins and causes of nationalism evolve with time, not many question the importance of nationalism as a particularly powerful ‘ism’ in western and central Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century.  Much of the heavy lifting of conventional historical thought on the dawn of nationalism in this context has been done by luminaries like Hayes, Kohn, and Snyder. Many more minor figures, to include many contemporary historians, have created niche areas of focus, expanding into other disciplines to develop their own particular component theories on the subject.  As the age of nationalism seems to fade under a resurgence of religious fundamentalism from political Islam, it is incumbent upon historians to explain contemporary nationalism and how it fits in today’s world.


Ashkenasi, Abraham.  Modern German Nationalism.  New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976.
Anderson Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.
Beard Charles, “Review of The Idea of Nationalism by Hans Kohn,” The American Political Science Review 38, no. 4 (August 1944), 801-803.
Berdahl, Robert M. “New Thoughts on German Nationalism.” The American Historical Review 77, no. 1 (February 1972).
Evans, Richard J. Rethinking German History. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
Ford, Guy Stanton. “Review of Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des Deutschen Nationalstaates by Friedrich Meinecke.” The American Historical Review 34, no. 4 (July, 1929), 826-827.
Goldstone Jack A. “Review of Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity by Liah Greenfeld.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 25, no 4 (Spring, 1995) 652-654.
Greenfeld, Liah.  Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Hayes, Carlton J. H. Essays on Nationalism. New York: MacMillan, 1926.
Hayes, Harmon. “Review of Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism by Robert Reinhold Ergang.” American Journal of Sociology 38, no. 5 (March 1933), 809-811.
Kohn, Hans. “The Eve of German Nationalism (1789-1812).” Journal of the History of Ideas 12, no. 2 (April 1951).
Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study In Its Origins And Background. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005.
Kohn, Hans.  Nationalism and Realism: 1852-1879.  Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968.
Kohn, Hans.  Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968.
Meinecke Friedrich. Weltbürgertum Und Nationalstaat: Studien Zur Genesis Des Deutschen Nationalstaates. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1922.
Pflanze, Otto. “Bismarck and German Nationalism.” The American Historical Review 60, no. 3 (April 1955).
Pinson, Koppel S. Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism (New York: Octagon Books, 1968).
Rich, Norman.  The Age of Nationalism and Reform: 1850-1890. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977.
Smith, Helmut Walser.  The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Snyder, Louis Leo.  German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People; Extremism Contra Liberalism in Modern German History.  Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1952.
Snyder, Louis Leo. The Meaning of Nationalism. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
Snyder, Louis Leo.  Roots of German Nationalism.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978.
Shanahan, William O. “A Neglected Source of German Nationalism: The Confederations of the Rhine, 1806-1813.” In Nationalism: Essays in Honor of Louis L. Snyder, edited by Michael Palumbo & William O. Shanahan, 103-130. London: Greenwood Press, 1981.
Waller, Bruce ed. Themes in Modern European History: 1830-1890. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.
Wolfson, Phillip J. “Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954)” Journal of the History of Ideas 17, no. 4 (October, 1956), 511-525.

[1] Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum Und Nationalstaat: Studien Zur Genesis Des Deutschen Nationalstaates (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1922).
[2] Guy Stanton Ford, “Review of Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des Deutschen Nationalstaates by Friedrich Meinecke” The American Historical Review 34, no. 4 (July, 1929), 826, 827.

[3] Helmut Walser Smith,  The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17.

[4] Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: MacMillan, 1926), 3.
[5] Ibid., 19.

[6] Ibid., 52.

[7] Ibid., 98-99.

[8] Ibid., 99.

[9] Harmon Hayes, “Review of Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism by Robert Reinhold Ergang,” American Journal of Sociology 38, no. 5 (March 1933), 809.

[10] Robert R. Ergang, Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 87.

                [11] Koppel S. Pinson, Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), 25.
[12] Ibid.

[13] Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), xii-xiii.

[14] Charles Beard, “Review of The Idea of Nationalism by Hans Kohn,” The American Political Science Review 38, no. 4 (August 1944), 802.

[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., 13.

[17] Ibid., 13-14.

[18] Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967).

[19] In this, Kohn also includes the Low Countries and Scandinavian.
[20] Louis L. Snyder, German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1952).

[21] Ibid., ii.
[22] Ibid.

[23] Snyder, Roots of German Nationalism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978).

[24] Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
[25] Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification 1815–71 (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1963).

[26] Norman Rich, The Age of Nationalism and Reform: 1850-1890 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), 44

[27] Abraham Ashkenasi, Modern German Nationalism.  New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976.

[28] Ibid., 29.

[29] Richard J. Evans, Rethinking German History (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

[31] Ibid., 14-15.

[32] Ibid., 15.
[33] Ibid., 48.

[34] Robert M. Berdahl, “New Thoughts on German Nationalism,” The American Historical Review 77, no. 1 (February 1972), 68.
[35] Ibid., 69.

[36] William O. Shanahan, “A Neglected Source of German Nationalism: The Confederations of the Rhine, 1806-1813,” in Nationalism: Essays in Honor of Louis L. Snyder, edited by Michael Palumbo & William O. Shanahan (London: Greenwood Press, 1981), 105.

[37] Ibid., 108-109.

[38] James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).
[39] Ibid., 5.

[40] Bruce Waller ed., Themes in Modern European History: 1830-1890, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

[41] Ibid., 221.

[42] Which, taken together could make the case that the French themselves created the German aggressor to the east.

[43] Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA:: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[44] Ibid., 5-9.

[45]Jack A. Goldstone, “Review of Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity by Liah Greenfeld,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 25, no 4 (Spring, 1995) 652-653.

[46] Ibid., 654.

[47] Helmut Walser Smith, The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).

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