The Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was a dress rehearsal for the events following the Sarajevo assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The diplomatic exchange between Russia and the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire left Russia embarrassed and looking for opportunity to redeem its standing within the Great Powers of the day.
Conflicts Between Great Powers
Most conflicts between nations happen when one or more
weakened powers withdraw from the scene and rising nations or neighbors scramble
for the leftovers. This is a scene that has been replayed throughout history
and can be seen in the rise and fall of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians,
Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Spaniards, French, Hapsburgs, Ottomans, Britons,
Americans, and China just to name a few. But rather than studying the war between
the Great Powers of 1914 through 1918, this essay will examine one of the
causes, perhaps the harbinger of the events of Sarajevo: the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina by the dual monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908.
This study will explain the context and background of the event; highlight the
historical context in which it occurred; identify the key players in the event;
examine the negotiations, the announcement, and the crisis to follow the event;
and analyze the outcomes and how it contributed to the decisions made in the
late summer of 1914. The study will show how an underestimation of nationalist
passions in the Balkans and a fumbling foreign policy led to the disgrace and
embarrassment of Russia on the world stage. It was an embarrassment that Russia
swore it would not suffer again.
The Historical Context
If
the Ottoman Empire was the “sick man of Europe,” then certainly the
Austro-Hungarian Empire had to be in the wings waiting to take up that title
upon the eventual passing of the frail Empire that for centuries bridged the
gap between the East and West. The decline of these two empires and the subsequent
struggle to pick up the pieces that occurred between the major powers of
Russia, France, Britain, and those new upstarts Germany and Italy led to
numerous conflicts, both diplomatic, and armed in the twenty or so years before
the events of August 1914. Prior to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
events that occurred in the Balkans and elsewhere betwixt the two dying Empires
had been localized with only moderate, passing interest paid by the monarchs of
the Great Powers. Yet, this one incident and the very public manner in which it
was done disgraced a powerful, but wounded empire that would bear bitter fruit
only six years later.
The
annexation was an attempt by Austria to shore up its declining power in the
Balkans, bring order to the chaos of the withdrawing Ottomans, stem the tide of
Slavic nationalism, and in the same light, to hold the line against the ambitious
nation of Serbia. Russia, the self-anointed protector of the Slavic people and
as evidenced in the Crimean War, the advocate of the Orthodox peoples in its
area of influence, was publically slighted and outraged when the issue of the
opening of the Dardanelles straight was not resolved. However angered the
Russian bear was, she was still licking her wounds following the disastrous
forays into Japan and Manchuria as well as dealing with the chaos and turmoil
of revolution. Unable to back up its goals through military means, the mighty
nation simmered and waited for an opportunity of her own to reinforce her
standing as a great power.
Dying Empires
At the turn of the Twentieth
Century, two empires lay dying. In the 1500s, the empires administered by the Hapsburgs
and the one by the Ottoman Turks spanned most of continental Europe, Asia
Minor, the Levant, and much of North Africa. The Ottoman Empire herself had
been in steady decline since her height in the late 1500s, notably due to
incompetent leadership; constant wars with her neighbors Austria and Russia;
and a stagnation of economy and technological progress. After being turned back
from the gates of Vienna in 1683, the Ottomans began their long retreat from
Europe. While they steadily withdrew, the Austrians fought their own decline
and struggled to maintain their territory.
At the height of their
power, the Hapsburgs of Austria had controlled the Iberian Peninsula, most of
Germany, several provinces in Italy, vast swathes of Eastern Europe, and of course
Austria herself. But, following the mid-1500s abdication of King Charles V, the
lands were ruled independently by his squabbling successors and Austria began
her great decline. One by one, the ethnically diverse provinces began to slip
away from Vienna’s central control. This decline occurred because of many
factors, chief among them being the
distractions of a continuous Ottoman invasion; the Protestant Reformation and
challenge of Catholic rule in the German states; and unstable, inflexible
rulers.
Sensing her decline Austria
perennially remained on the defensive, seeking out alliances whenever she could
find them. Militarily, they had been consistently defeated since the days of
Frederick the Great. They had to fend
off invasion from Prussia; they allied with Bordeaux France; they fought
Revolutionary France, and pragmatically divided the spoils; and they allied with
Russia to defend against Napoleonic invasion. By the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, Austria as an Empire was merely a shell of her former self.
Though the Great Powers
conspired to keep the peace and quell further revolutionary activity after
defeating Napoleon, the Pandora box of nationalism had been cracked. By the time
the 1848 revolutions swept across Europe, Russian-Austrian relationships had
gone stale as the Ottomans withdrew from the Balkans and nationalism swept
southern and eastern Europe. The Italian provinces united to form their own
nation. The Russians backed the independence movements of Slavic nations while
Austria saw its tenuous grip on the remaining parts of its Empire slipping. Austria
declined as alliances shifted and Prussia consolidated the German states and
squashed France in the wars of unification. After France aligned with Russia
out of fear of further Prussian aggression, Austria naturally sought protection
from Germany, her former rival for central European hegemony.
Russia at the Turn of the Century
In 1904, Russia went to war
with Japan. Russia desired secure, warm-water ports on the Pacific while Japan
viewed the Russian presence with warranted suspicion. For the Russians, it was
an unmitigated disaster. They were decisively defeated on the seas and their
losses catastrophic on land. The debacle led to the first revolution against
the Romanovs in 1905. The war with Japan left the Russian military in shambles,
unable to come to her ally France’s aid should the need arise. “Military
experts everywhere in Europe agreed that Russia was incapable of fighting an
offensive war throughout the period from 1906 to 1908. … Russian military
opinion considered that ‘Russia will for a certain time be almost valueless as
a military ally against Germany.’”[1] The Russian Chief of the General Staff, General F. F.
Palitsyn “estimated in March 1906 that it would be three and a half years
before the Russian army recovered fully, provided that enough money flowed to
keep the factories in production.”[2] It
was this impotence that encouraged rather than deterred German aggression in
the Moroccan crisis of 1905.
It may as well be a
certainty that Russia’s state of military disrepair was a significant factor in
the timing and decision-making of Austria-Hungary in the Bosnian issue. For the
past three years, the subject of Russia’s military weakness was a key point of
discussion in many circles. Military attachés from Austria and Germany both
regularly communicated with their governments on St. Petersburg’s lack of
preparedness. Indeed, in “a rare moment of candor”, Russia even acknowledged to
France’s military attaché, Brigadier General Moulin, that they “refused even to
prepare for taking the offensive against Germany;” a key component of the
mutual defense plan in case of German aggression against France.[3]
Politically, Russia had
undergone her first revolution in 1905 as multiple strikes crippled the country
following the Bloody Sunday killing of demonstrators in St. Petersburg. Due to
the ongoing war in the east, Nicholas II was unable to suppress the strikers
militarily and reluctantly agreed to liberal reforms that resulted in universal
suffrage, an elected legislature, and political parties.
In 1908, the very year of
the annexation of Bosnia, the Oktobrist Party leader, Aleksandr Guchkov
publically decried the Russian military’s state of readiness in a speech before
the Duma. While Guchkov no doubt intended his speech to be a boon to his
nationalist party and made it out of deep concern and for patriotic reasons,
his statements “laid open Russia’s military weakness for all to see.”[4] This speech was delivered
just three months before the annexation and simply confirmed Austria-Hungary’s estimation
of Russian preparedness.
Austria-Hungary at the Turn of the Century
Militarily, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire “continually amazed observers simply by continuing to
function at all.”[5]
The divided political nature of the Dual Monarchy between the Austrians and the
Magyars made even the simplest of annual military appropriations an exhausting
exercise. Like the squabbling that takes place today in the divided U.S.
Congress, the military was many times held hostage for mostly political reasons
in impasses between Hungarian legislators and those in Vienna. Despite the
losses of the Italian and German states, it is testament to the skill of
Austrian diplomats to have maintained the Empire’s own stability for as long as
they did.
While the military could not
be counted upon in times of crisis, the politicians of the Empire assuredly
could. The cruel reality of the times was that the Empire was “a weak agrarian
power that lacked both the economic resources of the Western powers and the
manpower with which Russia compensated for its backwardness, [and] simply
lacked the military strength to fulfill unaided the responsibilities thrust on
it.”[6] The upshot of this
situation was that Austria depended upon the alliances she created.
In the original Concert of
Europe, Austria-Hungary was charged with administering the Italian and German
states while the Ottomans, the Balkans.[7] Following the loss of
Italy and Germany to the nationalist cause, and the implosion of the Ottoman
power over its imperial holdings, Austria-Hungary rightly looked to its south
in concern. In an Empire comprised of numerous nationalities, languages, and
cultures, Vienna understood the threat to her integrity posed by nationalism
and set about attempting to stabilize its southern flank.
Serbia at the Turn of the Century
Serbia had become a
sovereign nation in 1878 and initially enjoyed fairly good relations with
Austria-Hungary. Much of the Dual Monarchy’s southern regions were populated by
Serbs whose forefathers had fled Ottoman oppression. For a time, the ethnic
Serbs in the Dual Monarchy enjoyed their freedoms but had more recently
experienced discrimination and persecution by the Roman Catholic majority. In
1903, a bloody palace coup in Belgrade installed Serbian nationalist Peter
Karageorgevitch as the new king of Serbia. This monarch rode a wave of popular
Serb nationalism. There was a palpable feeling of Slavic pride and the Austrians
feared that this nationalism on display in Belgrade “would act as a dangerous
magnet, tending to draw away Austria’s Serb subjects to form the ‘Greater
Serbia.’”[8]
With such a large and ethnically diverse population, Austria feared her ethnic
minority populations would be inspired by Serbia and attempt to throw off
Viennese rule.
Count Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky
Alexander
Petrovich Izvolsky was the Russian Foreign Minister during the Annexation
crisis. He had previously been posted to Tokyo during the build-up to the
Russo-Japanese War and followed that assignment as the Foreign Minister to
Denmark.[9] By
any account, Izvolsky was woefully unprepared for the ambitious foreign policy
he hoped to accomplish. The chief of Izvolsky’s concerns was the
reestablishment of Russia’s prestige following her humiliation in East Asia. The
seemingly surest way to accomplish that and perhaps the most feasible was to
force the issue of the opening of the Dardanelles straight; long a subject of Russian
discontent. Lacking a warm-water port with free access to the West, Russian
warships had for many years been held in check by the Ottomans who controlled
the straights. The implosion of Ottoman power and the Entente Russia reached
with Britain presented the ideal time to bargain for opening the straights.
Izvolsky
has been “described … as a man of great gifts but of inordinate ambition which
led him to seek laurels by rash actions.”[10] He
was “shrewd, subtle, proud, belonging to the Russian rural nobility but
supposed to be a great admirer of British Liberalism.”[11]
Count Alois Lexa von Ährenthal
Alois
Lexa von Ährenthal succeeded the “prudent Goluchowski” in the post of Foreign
Minister in 1906.[12] Britain’s
Asquith described Ährenthal as “the cleverest and perhaps least scrupulous of
Austrian statesmen.[13] Albertini
states “his diplomacy … composed more of hard arrogance and dissolvent intrigue
than of prudent reserve and ingratiating souplesse was a mixture of pretension
and subtlety, of force and ruse, of realism and cynicism: his readiness to
cheat, to circumvent, to outwit hid a harsh and ruthless will.”[14] Ährenthal’s
initial goal was to revive the Dreikaiserbund
in an attempt to make Austria less dependent upon Germany, which was a marked
departure from the policy of Goluchowski.[15] This
hope was shattered by the disclosure of the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 and was
replaced by a pragmatic policy of diffusing tensions within the Balkans. Ährenthal
hoped to accomplish this by isolating the Serbians and pacifying those Slavs
under the Double Eagle with a carrot approach rather than the stick; and by not
provoking the Russians.
Ährenthal
“resented the subordinate position in European politics to which the Monarchy
had been reduced in consequence of domestic crises and the great assertiveness
of Germany.”[16] He hoped that by
negotiating with Russia on the subject of Bosnia while offering them support
for the opening of the Bosporus the result would be a foreign policy coup for
Austrian prestige, a stabilization of her southern borders, and a lesser need
to rely on Germany.
The Negotiations
In
September of 1907, heady with confidence over his securing the British Entente
which defused Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East, Izvolsky went to
Vienna to meet with his Austrian counterpart Ährenthal. Since 1904, Izvolsky
had been trying to force the issue of the Dardanelles with any Great Power that
would listen. He unsuccessfully tried to bend the ear of Britain’s Edward VII
at Copenhagen when he was the ambassador to Denmark and again unsuccessfully
attempted during the Entente negotiations with Britain in 1907.[17]
During
the informal discussions with Ährenthal, Izvolsky mentioned the question of the
Dardanelles. He plainly stated the Russian desire to open them to her war ships
was an even higher priority now that she had lost her port to the Pacific at
Port Arthur. Ährenthal, quickly recognizing an opportunity to advance his
agenda of pulling the southern Slavs under the wing of the Dual Monarchy, less
than subtly mentioned the possibility of formally annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina.[18] Izvolsky
showed support for this arrangement and the two went their separate ways.
Following
the Vienna meeting, Ährenthal brought the subject of the annexation to his
government and was answered with tacit agreement. Ährenthal wished to use the
subject of the Sandžak of Novibazar to sweeten the deal for the Russians. Under
the 1885 Treaty of Berlin, Austria-Hungary was charged with not only occupying
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also this small province which was also under titular
control of the Ottomans. In this aspect Ährenthal and the Austrian Chief of the
General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf clashed. Von Hötzendorf viewed the small
strip separating Montenegro from Serbia as a defense against pan-Slavic
aspirations and as a fail-safe path to the Aegean, while Ährenthal saw the
Sandžak as a somewhat meaningless piece of land but withdrawing its military
forces from it as a powerful symbolic gesture of Austria’s intentions of no
further designs of expansion.[19]
In
January 1908, after attaining consent from his home government to pursue the
military abandonment of the Sandžak, Ährenthal publically announced designs for
a railway transecting the same Sandžak.[20] This
sparked the beginning of misunderstandings and conflict. The Russians
interpreted this move as duplicitous in intent; signaling an Austrian desire to
encircle Serbia. Albertini opines Ährenthal proposed the line so as “to enhance
the value of this renunciation in the eyes of the Great Powers.”[21]
The Russian perspective on this point seems more accurate in that one of the
intentions of Austria was in fact to isolate Serbia from potential expansion. Now
whether that isolation was intended to be defensive or offensive in nature
depends on who was able to more effectively bend the ear of Francis Joseph. There
is no reason to believe the architect of the policy, Ährenthal had any designs
on Serbia, though a case can certainly be made that von Hötzendorf wished to
strike Serbia.
On
July 2, Izvolsky penned a letter to Ährenthal that expressed Russian consent to
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in exchange for Austria’s expression of support for the opening of
the Dardanelles to Russian war ships.[22] In
this curious wording, Izvolsky committed a diplomatic blunder of an almost
unprecedented scale; effectively granting every demand while receiving nothing
tangible in return.
While
Ährenthal’s plans came along slowly, in July 1908 an event happened which
threatened to forestall the intentions of both Austria and Russia. The sick man
of Europe experienced a cure in the form of the Young Turk revolution. The
accompanying reforms and positive, ambitious outlook of the Committee of Union
and Progress worried Ährenthal that the reforming Turks may gain support of
several of the Great Powers and undermine the design to wrest away
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria.[23] So
Ährenthal sped up his timeline and in August and early September, he gained
assent from the dual governments of the Dual Monarchy for the design upon
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the withdrawal from the Sandžak.
On
September 16 1908, Izvolsky met with Ährenthal at Buchlau castle in the
modern-day Czech Republic to discuss the issues of the annexation, the
withdrawal from the Sandžak, and the Bosporus Straights. From here,
unfortunately, all that remains is the written account of Ährenthal as
Izvolsky did not take notes on the deliberations. What did occur following the
meeting is known. Izvolsky departed Buchlau at a leisurely pace, taking a
holiday while enroute to present the proposals to the signatories of the Treaty
of Berlin; the key action necessary to gain consent for the various points which
were agreed to at Buchlau.[24] Ährenthal,
on the other hand, immediately got to work on implementing the annexation plan.
In
concert with his plans to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ährenthal also hinted
strongly to Sofia to declare her independence from the Turks. Ährenthal
believed having Bulgaria proclaim her independence would overshadow what he
thought to be the measly matter of formerly annexing a de-facto province of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. This being done, the Bulgars jumped the gun on Ährenthal
and proclaimed their independence on October 5. This annoyed Ährenthal greatly,
forcing him to move up his timeline by a few days, and made the announcement of
the annexation the same day.[25]
This,
October 5, being less than a month after Buchlau, and before Izvolsky had
spoken with France and Britain, hit the international community hard. Stunned
by the announcement, Izvolsky suddenly found himself under fire from the
British and French, who were not amiable to the deal and had not been
consulted. It especially angered the Serbs who viewed the annexation as a
threat to their sovereignty.[26]
The
conference of Buchlau is one of the great mysteries found in history. Precisely
what wording was used during the meeting is lost with varying interpretations
existing between eminent historians like Albertini, Fay, Fleming, and Schmitt. As
told by the translator of Izvolsky’s memoirs, Charles Louis Seeger, it is a
shame that Izvolsky’s early death interrupted his plan to write his version of
the details of the Bosnia affair that are now hidden to history.[27] The
lack of documentation of the negotiations between Ährenthal and Izvolsky from
the Russian point of view leaves us only with Ährenthal’s version of the story.
Though Ährenthal and Izvolsky’s accounts following the conference differ, it is
likely that Izvolsky was unaware of the timing of the annexation and was
purposefully kept in the dark by Ährenthal.[28]
It
is clear that there was a divide in at least the agreements from both sides. Izvolsky
maintained the terms negotiated at Buchlau were to be subject to the ratification
of the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin as these changes necessitated
significant revisions to the document. Ährenthal agreed to the need for a
conference of nations to apply revisions but claimed he told Izvolsky the question
of the annexation was to be off the table and a settled matter. It is hard to
believe Izvolsky agreed to such a statement or even had the authority from the
Tsar to make it but Izvolsky could never produce any documentation presenting
his side of the story while Ährenthal could produce his official documentation
of the events that took place on September 16.
Ährenthal
knew Russia's weakness; her fear of revolution. He correctly assessed the
egoism and ambition of Izvolsky. He was aware of the
weakness, ineptitude, and the paralyzing indecision of Nicholas II.
Furthermore, the German fear of a policy of encirclement fostered by Great
Britain had been aroused by the conferences at Algeciras and Reval. Ährenthal gambled
that Germany would not abandon her only reliable European ally. It was a safe
bet. … Ährenthal duped Izvolsky, humiliated the Russian Empire, and seized from
Germany the diplomatic initiative which Bismarck had preserved so jealously.[29]
The Announcement and Crisis
The
October 5 1908 announcement by Francis Joseph of the formal annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina sent shockwaves from Sarajevo to Moscow, from Skopje to
London, from Belgrade to Paris. Serbia’s close ally and Jugoslav aspirant Montenegro angrily rejected the land-grab and
announced it would no longer hold to Article 29 of the Berlin treaty which
limited its sovereignty on its coastline with the Adriatic.[30] Cetinje
made its own formal list of demands and delivered them to Izvolsky to be
presented at the assumed upcoming European Conference to negotiate the changes.
These included a rescinding of the annexation, a deletion of Article 29, and
other small territorial changes to Montenegro’s benefit.[31]
France
had been forewarned of the announcement by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. Having
assumed Izvolsky had already communicated the agreements reached at Buchlau,
Count Khevenhüller, the ambassador, relayed the news of the imminent annexation
to the French government. In the relaying of the message, Khevenhüller, allayed
French worries by stating the initiative had “the concurrence of the Cabinets
of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Rome.”[32] With
this assurance that her ally Russia was satisfied, France, with the exception
of Prime Minister Clemenceau reacted in a rather apathetic manner.
Shortly
after the French notification, the Quai d’Orsay notified Britain as well.[33] Britain
was not so much concerned by the actual event as much as to the damage done to
the new Turkish government that it backed. Britain equally did not wish to
offend its new partner Russia in the very beginning of their new-found warm
relationship. They swiftly issued a demarche to Vienna expressing their concern
for the method used in securing this annexation and further concern for the
state of treaties if they could be re-written with secret negotiations of a
minority of parties.[34] Yet
Britain never considered going to war to protect the egos of the Russians, or
the insult upon the Turks. It hoped to methodically keep the peace and the
status quo of the alliances developed.
The
Germans supported the annexation but the Kaiser was incensed it had been made
without consultation with him. Since Bismarck, the hallmark of German foreign
policy was to keep France weak and out of alliance with another foreign power. Since
Bismarck’s dismissal, the collapse of Austro-Russian relations, and the
Franco-Russian entente, the Bismarck strategy morphed into rupturing the
alliance. It is a logical conclusion that severely damaging Russian interests
in the Balkans without having an active hand therein would serve to severely
strain the ties between Paris and St. Petersburg. Certainly Bülow and Wilhelm both
knew the French would not go to war over the Slavic question and saw this as an
opportunity to support an ally whilst simultaneously driving a wedge between
Paris and St. Petersburg, showing France’s unsteady nature as an ally.
After
the announcement Ottoman Turkey was understandably miffed. In one fell stroke
she had lost nominal control of the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of
Bulgaria. Yet, she was pragmatic enough to understand that her only recourse
lay not in the force of arms, but in appealing to the Great Powers for either
redress or compensation. “After the first feelings of indignation had died
down, the Porte took the position that while it was prepared to reconcile
itself with the fait accompli in
Bosnia, … it must be compensated for the loss of the Bulgarian tribute.”[35] Faced
with this demand and knowing that the subject of Bosnia would likely arise in
any European Conference forced by the issue of Bulgaria, the Dual Monarchy
along with Bulgaria came to terms of monetary compensation to be paid to Turkey
for the territories. The private manner in which the compensation question
happened kept the Turkish demand for a conference off the table, further
enhancing the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s annexation as a fait accompli.
Naturally,
Serbia had the largest outcry. Scores of demonstrators in the streets of Belgrade
hurled invective at Vienna. Stuck between the rock of possible revolution and
the hard place of unintentionally provoking Austrian military response, the
Serbian government mobilized its reserve military to deal with the unrest.[36] The
Serbian parliament passed resolutions condemning the action, secured war bonds
as insurance, and created something that played a major part in the events of
1914. Schmitt describes it thusly:
In
the light of subsequent history, however, the most important incident of these
days was the establishment of the society called Narodna Odbrana [“National Defence”], “which should protect and
promote our interests in the annexed provinces” … it was to the alleged
activities of this organization that the Austro-Hungarian government ascribed
the revolutionary ferment in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was mad the basis for the
ultimatum of 23 July 1914.[37]
In
the months following the announcement, Serbia increased the heated rhetoric,
demanding Bosnia be given its independence and territorial compensation for
herself. Belgrade continued to make appropriations for war funding and conducted
their annual induction of new army recruits four months early.[38]
In
all of this, Britain, France, and Germany looked upon the crisis with concern
but were unwilling to step in themselves to solve the crisis backed by military
force. Germany of course, was in favor of the outcome of the announcement while
Britain and France were mainly concerned for the continuation of peaceful
relations in the region and that Turkey received a fair shake.
The
Russian response to the announcement is somewhat of a mystery as well. It is a
testament to Izvolsky’s amateur handling of the entire affair that official Russian sentiment from St.
Petersburg was against the annexation that Izvolsky had reportedly assented to.
The Russian Prime Minister Stolypin and Nicholas II both rejected the
annexation outright. It was such a rejection that Stolypin threatened resignation
should Russia concur with the annexation.[39]
It is unclear if Izvolsky acted on his own accord at Buchlau and negotiated
away concessions that he had no right to or if Ährenthal had cleverly
manipulated statements from Izvolsky he never intended to make. The Russian
narrative itself is not consistent. There does exist conflicting stories about
Nicholas II’s foreknowledge and agreement to the affair.[40] Regardless,
Russia was upset and pushed for a European congress to settle the issue.
Mercer
rightly contends Russia knew the inevitability of the annexation and
essentially sought to get “something for nothing” whilst “exploit[ing]
anti-Austrian feelings in the Balkans and capitaliz[ing] on Europe’s dismay
over the violation of the Berlin treaty.”[41]
This strategy of course, hinged on keeping the negotiations at Buchlau secret.
Ährenthal, though, was forced by events occurring in Turkey and Bulgaria to
force the issue quicker than the Russians expected. And when Izvolsky expressed
buyer’s remorse, the threat of releasing the Ährenthal account of the
conference at Buchlau quieted the official Russian stance, forcing her to
internalize its grievances.
Following
Britain and French demurring on opening a conference on the issue of the
annexation and the Serbs preparing for war with the Dual Monarchy,
Austria-Hungary appealed to Germany for assistance to mediate the crisis.
Germany responded by issuing a telegram to Nicholas II that in no uncertain
terms, demanded their assent to the annexation of Bosnia with no strings
attached, else, Germany would stand by and let “things take their course.”[42]
This of course insinuated that Austria-Hungary would militarily step in and
crush Serbia. Russia, in her feeble state, knew it could not intervene to help,
and given the sentiments of France and Britain, she knew she had no choice but
to assent to the demands and tell Serbia to stand down.
Analysis of the Fallout
Throughout
the affair, Izvolsky comes across as relatively ignorant, unprepared, and
inadequately matched in comparison to Ährenthal. While Ährenthal understood the
political as well as military concerns of his government, for example, in
dealing with the issue of the Sandžak, Izvolsky showed remarkable ignorance in
the state of affairs of the Russian military following the disasters in the
east. Just two years following the defeat, Izvolsky had “suggested that joint
Anglo-Russian military action in Turkey” could have very beneficial
consequences for Russian interest in the region.[43] This
suggestion was of course made during the period in which all military attachés
regularly reported to their governments of the inability of Russia to wage any
offensive war. This is in addition to the political realities of post-Revolutionary
Russia in which the people had little stomach for more foreign adventures in
pursuit of the glory of Imperial Russia.
Due
to the debacle, Russia realized her impotence and had vastly underestimated the
outrage generated by Serbia. She had unwittingly uncovered a seething hot-bed
of nationalism in her own sphere of influence that threatened to undermine the
partnership, albeit uneasy, it had enjoyed with Austria-Hungary for many years.
“In the face of these elemental forces the diplomatic devices of a tiny
decision-making elite that had contained Austro-Russian differences … for the
past century were swept away.”[44]
At
the end of the affair, the Russians found themselves out-maneuvered on all
fronts. Her alliance with France was established primarily as a mutual defense
against Teutonic aggression, not as a club with which to back up Slavic
interests in the Balkans. Despite the underhanded nature of Ährenthal’s
diplomacy, France would never come to Russia’s aid militarily solely to avenge offenses
done to Serbia. Britain was only in the beginning stages of friendly relations
with Russia having sparred with the bear for many years over the Middle East. Neither
Grey, nor Clemenceau would back up Russia with military might over this minor
regional issue.
As
has been shown, Serbia was outraged and pushed what most expected to be a minor
bump in international relations up to the point of armed conflict between
herself and Austria-Hungary. That the Great Powers underestimated the terrific
response from Belgrade is understandable given that Russia had already in a
conspiratorial manner handed over the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
the Dual Monarchy in 1877 as compensation for remaining neutral in a
Russo-Turkish war.[45] The
fact that the Serbs flew into an uproar when the provinces were officially
handed over speaks volumes to the passion of the flame of Slavic nationalism
and the conflagration that would ignite in Sarajevo not only six years later.
It
is this writer’s contention that Izvolvky and Ährenthal did not set out to
destroy a working partnership with each other. They were not intent on building
an alliance. They did not wish to poison their relations to the extent that it
did six months following the annexation announcement. Both Izvolsky and Ährenthal
believed the peoples being bartered in private talks would simply go along with
whatever outcome the powerful elites determined for them. This estimation was
based upon the normal course of affairs history had displayed. The passion that nationalism could inflame
was a very new phenomenon. They vastly
underestimated the reactions their decisions would make in Bulgaria, Serbia,
Montenegro, and elsewhere.
In
many historical circles, Austria-Hungary gets the majority of the blame for
causing the crisis. Certainly, Ährenthal was evasive and duplicitous in his
dealings with Russia, but how can he be blamed for accepting a diplomatic gift
from an incoherent and incompetent Russian government? Now whether
Austria-Hungary should get the blame for setting the ripe conditions for the Great
War to take place six years later is another matter, but certainly none of the
powers believed the little regional spat between the powers could evolve into
that great a mess.
While
Austria was opportunistic and devious, Russia, of course had fumbled the entire
exchange. Nicholas II claimed to have not given permission to Izvolsky to
barter away Bosnia-Herzegovina no matter what the price, though Izvolsky’s
assistant denies this, stating the Tsar had approved a memorandum detailing the
plan prior to Izvolsky’s approach to Ährenthal.[46] When
Francis Joseph announced the annexation, Nicholas II decried it, isolating
Izvolsky. How this occurred exactly is unknown. Schmitt speculates it could be
attributed to the Tsar’s propensity to go along with whatever the latest aid or
advisor said.[47] Whatever happened,
Izvolsky was abandoned by his government and left to attempt to force a
European Conference to which Austria-Hungary could be brought to heel by
France, Britain, and Russia. This, of course, the second Algeciras, never
happened and Russia was left smarting to restore her credibility both amongst
the Great Powers from a military standpoint, and to the Slavs in the Balkans
who rightly wondered if they had been sold down the river by their benefactor. “The
Russians themselves were determined at all costs that the humiliation of 1909
must never be repeated.”[48]
While
it is clear that the crisis of the annexation did not result in general war, it
is an interesting proposal to consider what could have happened had Russia’s
military not been so incapable or politics so unsteady. Would Nicholas II have
moved upon Austria Hungary because of this offense? It is unlikely given the
risk versus reward considerations for such a seemingly minor offense. However,
given Nicholas’s ineptitude and instability it is worthy of consideration. It seems
more likely that if the Russians had more potent a military capacity, Ährenthal,
astute as he was, would not have so brazenly affronted Russia. Still, given the
events of July and August 1914, it is a valid question.
Despite
the perception of bowing to Slavic interests, during the crisis, Russia was not
so much concerned about the nation of Serbia or some of the Slavic peoples in
the Balkans, but was mortified by the prospect of losing her status as one of
the Great Powers. For Russia, the existential threat of the whole affair was
that “of an Austro-Hungarian punitive expedition against Serbia and the blow
that this would deal, by exposing Russia’s impotence to prevent it, to her
standing as a Great Power, both in the Balkan capitals and in Europe
generally.”[49] Given Russia’s weakness,
it is puzzling that Izvolsky set out on an ambitious foreign policy to repair
her damage in the Japanese war. Gooch explains Russia’s foreign follies in the
years immediately following the humbling in Japan thusly:
Russia
… was unfit for war, and should have kept aloof from the quarrels of the
Powers. Her initial mistake in tying herself to France and thereby needlessly
antagonising Germany was followed by an endeavour to secure hegemony in the
Balkans, which involved the hostility of Austria.[50]
Why
Russia would risk this kind of damage to her standing in the world for only the
prospect of opening the Bosporus Straights is also a good question. Izvolsky
must have been extremely overconfident in the prospects of achieving this goal
as all it took was the casual mention of Austria’s openness to the idea that
led him to pursue it with reckless abandon. “By threatening to resist and then
backing down, Russia lost far more than a payoff from the Austrians. The
situation in 1909 led others to ignore later Russian diplomatic statements.”[51]
How the Annexation Crisis Anticipated the Great War
It
is important to place the Bosnian annexation crisis in context not only of what
was to occur in 1914 but also in light of what previously happened in the first
Moroccan crisis and the subsequent conference that resulted in Germany backing
down due to the combined, unwavering pressure of France and Britain. Mercer
explores how the fallout from that conflict informed how the participants of
this Balkan crisis would react not three years later. Following Algeciras,
“Germany left … with three lessons: Germany had a reputation for lacking
resolve and other states would seek to exploit it; Germany was alone in the
world except for Austria and so Vienna must be supported; Germany should avoid
conferences when in the minority.”[52]
This accounts for how the German position against a European Conference to
settle the Bosnian affair was so intransigent. One can extend this logic
further to explain how Germany did not believe Russia would mobilize in 1914 to
protect Serbia from Austrian attack.
The
systems of alliances that developed post-Bismarck were expedient and largely
untested prior to the first Moroccan crisis. At Algeciras, the Franco-British
Entente Cordiale was put to the test with Germany experiencing a diplomatic
defeat and sensing the need to deepen its own alliance with Austria-Hungary. The
Bosnian crisis served this purpose nicely. While Wilhelm was likely truthfully
furious that he was not consulted by Austria, he had to have been pleased the
crisis occurred as it did with the strengthening of Austria and the
relationship with her. The overall “result of the crisis was thus to
consolidate both alliance systems, to extend the scope of the German-Austrian
one, and to increase the level of tension between the two.”[53]
It
was this mentality of the fear of a loss of prestige that was shared by all the
belligerents of 1914. Russia was terrified she would never be taken seriously
in international affairs due to the Bosnian affair. Austria-Hungary sensed its
own weakness and susceptibility to being torn apart piece-meal from the inside
by nationalists. France felt threatened by Germany’s industrial and military
might and had good reason to be due to the lessons of 1871. Germany felt
surrounded by large powers, one of which she had offended recently, and the
other which had allied militarily with the first one. Britain felt threatened
as her main claim to being a Great Power, her navy, was on the cusp of being
eclipsed by the new industrial power of Germany. In 1914, all of these nations
went to war to protect their prestige, their borders, and their ability to do
so. In that sense, the Great War was inevitable.
[Russia’s]
inability to take up the challenge in 1909 was a bitter memory, and no one had
a right to expect that she would submit to such a humiliation again. … By 1914
she had regained her self-confidence and was prepared to meet a challenge from
any quarter. Had she left her protégé to the tender
mercies of Austria, she would have forfeited all claim to be the champion of
the Slavonic races and have handed over the Balkan peninsula and Turkey without
a struggle to the domination of the Central Powers. Russia could no more be
expected to remain neutral in face of an Austrian attack on Serbia than England
in face of a German attack on Belgium. The same instinctive pride of a Great
Power which compelled Vienna to throw down the glove compelled Petrograd to
take it up.[54]
Bibliography
Albertini, Luigi. The Origins of the War of 1914, Volumes I,
2, and 3. Translated and edited Isabella M. Massey. London: Oxford University
Press, 1952.
Cornwall, Mark, ed. The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A
Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe. Exeter:
University of Exeter Press, 2002.
Dailey, Kenneth I.
“Isvolsky and the Buchlau Conference,” Russian
Review 10, no. 1 (January 1951): 55-63.
Fleming, D. F. The Origins and Legacies of World War I.
New York: Doubleday, 1968.
Gooch, G. P. “Recent
Revelations on European Diplomacy,” British
Institute of International Affairs 2, no. 1 (January 1923): 1-29.
Guisinger, Alexandra
and Alastair Smith. “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and
Political Institutions in International Crises,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 2002): 175-200.
Hamilton, Richard F.
and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for War,
1914-1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Izvolsky, Alexander
Petrovich.. Recollections of a Foreign
Minister. Translated by Charles Louis Seeger. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
Page & Company, 1921.
Massey, Isabella M.
“The Diplomatic Origins of the First World War,” International Affairs 25, no. 2 (April 1949): 182-191.
May, Arthur J. “The
Novibazar Railway Project,” The Journal
of Modern History 10, no. 4 (December 1938): 496-527.
Mercer, Jonathan. Reputation and International Politics.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Schmitt, Bernadotte. The Annexation of Bosnia: 1908-1909. New
York: Howard Fertig, 1970.
Snyder, Glenn H. “The
Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World
Politics 36, no 4 (July 1984): 461-495.
Strachan, Hew, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of the First
World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Treadway, John D. The Falcon & the Eagle: Montenegro and
Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press,
1983.
[1]
David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe
and the Making of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 61.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Ibid., 113.
[5]
Ibid., 97.
[6] F.
R. Bridge, “The Foreign Policy of the Monarchy,” in The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in Early
Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Mark Cornwall (Exeter: University of Exeter
Press, 2002), 14.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the
World War: Volume I, Before Sarajevo (New York: The Free Press, 1966),
358-359.
[9]
Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky, Recollections
of a Foreign Minister, trans. Charles Louis Seeger (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921), 3-5.
[10]
Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War
of 1914, Volume I, trans. and ed. Isabella M. Massey (London: Oxford
University Press, 1952), 188.
[11]Fay,
368.
[12]
Ibid., 190.
[13]
Ibid., 191.
[14]
Albertini, 190-191.
[15]
Fay, 369.
[16]
Bernadotte Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia: 1908-1909 (New York: Howard
Fertig, 1970), 4.
[17]
Fay, 367.
[18]Ibid.,
369.
[19]
Albertini, 194.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
Ibid., 195.
[23]
Ibid., 196, 197.
[24]
Ibid., 207.
[25]
Ibid., 217-218.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Izvolsky, v.
[28] Kenneth
I. Dailey, “Isvolsky and the Buchlau Conference,” Russian Review 10, no. 1 (January 1951), 59-61.
[29]
Ibid., 61-62.
[30]
John D. Treadway, The Falcon & the
Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914 (West Lafayette, IN:
Purdue University Press, 1983), 23, 24.
[31]
Ibid.
[32]
Schmitt, 34.
[33]
Ibid.
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
Schmitt, 100.
[36]
Ibid., 46.
[37]
Ibid., 47.
[38]
Ibid., 146
[39]
Ibid., 36.
[40]
Schmitt, 20.
[41]
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and
International Politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 115.
[42]
Albertini, 286.
[43]
Fay, 371.
[44]
Bridge, 23.
[45]
Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions
for War, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37.
[46]
Schmitt, 20.
[47]
Ibid., 36.
[48]
Bridge, 25.
[49]
Bridge, 24.
[50]
G. P. Gooch, “Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy,” British Institute of International Affairs 2, no. 1 (January 1923),
21.
[51] Alexandra
Guisinger and Alastair Smith, “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation
and Political Institutions in International Crises,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 2002), 190.
[52]
Mercer, 130.
[53]
Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no 4 (July 1984),
478.
[54]
Gooch, 27.
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