Well, here it is. My thesis:
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Abstract
The October 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and the simultaneous declaration of independence by Bulgaria may have only
formalized two preexisting conditions within the outlying provinces of the
once-mighty Ottoman Empire, yet the move by the Austo-Hungarian government to
solidify its holdings in Slavic lands sparked a crisis that is comparable to
the events of July and August 1914. Yet, this incident did not provide the
spark that led to the general European conflagration. Every historian has since
looked on the annexation crisis in the context of World War I.
This study will look at the events in question
while attempting to break away from the gravitational pull that is the Great
War. In particular, it will examine the actions of Great Britain and the
genuine, but ineffectual attempt to mediate between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
It will show that the mediation efforts conducted by Lord Grey of Falladon,
head of the Foreign Office, were doomed to failure because Britain did not have
as much at stake as other participants in the crisis, the efforts were marked
by unclear and inconsistent communication with her ally Russia, and were
conducted out of a sense of fear of failure.
Table
of Contents
Table of Figures
Key Personalities
Von Ährenthal,
Count Alois Lexa: Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Asquith, H. H., 1st Earl of
Oxford and Asquith: Prime Minister of the British Empire.
Barrère, Camille: French Ambassador at Rome.
Benckendorff, Alexander Konstantinovich:
Russian Ambassador at London.
Berchtold, Count Leopold: Austrian
Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
Bertie, Sir Francis, 1st Viscount
of Thame: British Ambassador at Paris.
Bompard, Maurice: French Ambassador at St.
Petersburg (1902-1908).
Von Bülow, Fürst Bernhard: Chancellor of the
German Empire.
Cambon, Jules: French Ambassador at Berlin.
Cambon, Paul: French Ambassador at London.
Cartwright, Sir Fairfax Leighton: British Ambassador
at Vienna (1906-1913).
Clemenceau, Georges: Prime Minister of the
French Republic.
Constans, Jean Antoine Ernest: French
Ambassador at Constantinople.
Crozier, Philippe: French Ambassador at
Vienna.
Egerton, Sir Edwin Henry: British Ambassador
at Rome (1905-1908).
Forgách, Count Janós: Austrian Ambassador at
Belgrade.
Goschen, Sir William Edward, 1st
Baronet: British Ambassador at Vienna (1905-1908) and Berlin (1908-1914).
Grey, Sir Edward, Lord Falladon: British
Foreign Minister.
Grouitch, Slavko: Serbian Ambassador at
London.
Khevenhüller, Count Rudolf: Austrian
Ambassador at Paris.
Kiderlen-Wächter, Alfred: Acting German
Ambassador at Constantinople (1908), Deputy Foreign Secretary of the German
Empire (1908-1910).
Lascelles, Sir Frank Cavendish: British
Ambassador at Berlin (1895-1907).
Louis, George: French Ambassador to St.
Petersburg (1908-1913).
Lowther, Sir Gerard, 1st Baronet:
British Ambassador at Constantinople (1908-1916).
Lützow, Count Heinrich: Austrian Ambassador
at Rome.
Marschall, Baron Alfred von Bieberstein:
German Ambassador at Constantinople.
Mensdorff, Count Albert: Austrian Ambassador
at London.
Metternich, Count Paul Wolff of Gracht:
German Ambassador at London.
Monts, Count Anton: German Ambassador at
Rome.
Nelidov, Aleksandr: Russian Ambassador at
Paris.
Nicolson, Lord Arthur, 1st Lord
of Carnock: British Ambassador at St. Petersburg (1906-1910).
O’Conor, Sir Nicholas Roderick: British
Ambassador at Constantinople (1898-1908).
Osten-Sacken, Nicolai Dmitrijevitch: Russian
Ambassador at Berlin.
Pallavicini, Count Johann: Austrian
Ambassador at Constantinople.
Pichon, Stéphen-Jean-Marie: French Foreign
Minister.
Popovich: Serbian Ambassador at St.
Petersburg.
Pourtalés, Count Friedrich: German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
Radolin, Prince Hugo of Radolin: German
Ambassador at Paris.
Ratibor, Prince Karl Max: German Ambassador
at Belgrade.
Rodd, Lord James Rennell, 1st
Baron Rennell: British Ambassador at Rome (1908-1919).
Von Schön,
Baron Wilhelm: Foreign Secretary of the German Empire.
Sergeyev, B.: Russian Ambassador at
Belgrade.
Szögyény, Count László: Austrian Ambassador
at Berlin.
Tschirschky, Baron Heinrich Leonhard: German
Ambassador at Vienna.
Urusov, Lev Pavlovich: Russian Ambassador at
Vienna.
Wesnitch: Serbian Ambassador at Paris.
Whitehead, Sir James Beethom: British
Ambassador at Belgrade.
Wuitsch: Serbian Ambassador at Rome.
Introduction
On October 6 1908,
Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This act precipitated
a Balkan crisis during which the Great Powers of Austria-Hungary, Britain,
France, Germany, and Russia nearly came to war. The formal annexation was a
violation of the terms of the Berlin treaty of 1875, which the Great Powers
established following the Russo-Turkish war of the early 1870s.
Austria-Hungary’s interest of maintaining an ethnically diverse Empire was pitted
against Russia’s interest in protecting Orthodox Slavs and its ultimate goal of
securing the Bosporus straights. This played out on the setting of the
once-mighty Ottoman Empire continued crumbling and the emergent nationalism of
the Balkan states. The Berlin treaty had commissioned Austria-Hungary to
administer the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina whilst they nominally belonged
to the Ottoman Empire. The annexation sparked outrage in neighboring Serbia who
dreamt of a greater united Slavic state and impugned Austria-Hungary for her
creeping incursion upon Slavic lands.
The strong-armed
tactics of Baron von Ährenthal,
the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister and the full support of her strong ally
Germany stared down a Russian Empire weakened by revolution and a disastrous
war in the Far East. From the October announcement up until mid-February 1909,
the governments of Britain and France, new allies of Russia, generally stood to
the side, allowing Turkey, Serbia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary to come to terms
before calling for a general conference of the powers to amend the Treaty to
terms acceptable to all.
In early February
1909, when Baron Isvolsky, the Russian foreign minister remarked of the
severity of his concern that Austria-Hungary would attack Serbia, the British
Foreign Office, led by Lord Edward Grey, decided to intervene and attempt to
mediate the crisis. The arrogance and hubris of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign
Minister, the naiveté and paranoia of the Russian Foreign Minister, and
unwavering German support for her Austro-Hungarian ally scuttled the attempts
by Britain to mediate the crisis successfully. This study will demonstrate that
this intervention attempt was conducted out of a sense of fear of losing the
Entente with Russia in the Middle and Far East and that it was an anemic
attempt distinguished by a lack of both steely resolve and clear, consistent
communication.
This study will examine
the official diplomatic papers of the participant countries involved to include
Britain, France, Germany, Serbia, and Russia. It will also utilize archived
issues of the Times of London from the time period, as well as autobiographies
of some of the important figures involved to include British Foreign Minister
Edward Grey; German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow; and the Chief of Staff of
the Austro-Hungarian Army, Conrad von Hötzendorf.
Literature Review
A historiography of the
literature available on the causes and origins of the First World War would,
and has, taken up entire volumes. Many historians have written quite
authoritatively on the subject of the annexation crisis, but all have viewed it
in the context of the road to the war of 1914. The vast majority of authors who
do touch on the topic of the annexation crisis, speak only very briefly upon it.
Those that do inevitably find apt comparisons to the events of July and August
1914 following the Sarejevo assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Furthermore,
those who write on the crisis itself nearly always rely on and cite the
scholarship of three authoritative historians from the 1920s to 1950s. Sidney
Bradshaw Fay in The Origins of the World
War was one of the first historians to take a more measured, analytical
approach to the causes of the Great War of 1914.[1]
He rejected the conventional, reactionary view of the victors, and cast as
much, if not more, blame upon Russia as Germany for the events leading up to
1914. In the case of the annexation crisis, Fay’s description of the events
reads like an abstract of conclusions he has already reached regarding their
interpretation. Though Fay provides documentary citations for his chief
arguments, his account is by no means, meant to be a detailed account of the
annexation crisis.
Albertini’s enormous,
three-volume The Origins of the War of
1914 is the most comprehensive examination of the events leading up to
August 1914. Starting in 1879 at the beginning of the Dual Alliance between
Germany and Austria-Hungary, Albertini draws upon the plethora of published
diplomatic correspondence that was available following the Second World War.
Although Albertini does a masterful job at both organization and detail, he
openly acknowledges his accounts of events are not detailed examinations of the
events themselves, but narratives presented from the later perspective of the First
World War. “It is not proposed here to give a detailed account, on the basis of
diplomatic documents, of the crisis caused by the annexation, but only to show
its effects on the situation which, in July 1914, was to lead Austria to send
Serbia the fatal ultimatum that caused the European conflagration.”[2]
Albertini, being an Italian minister of parliament, also understandably dwells
far more on the role and perspective of Tittoni during the Bosnian annexation
crisis.
Professor Bernadotte
Schmitt’s magnificent book on the crisis, The
Annexation of Bosnia 1908 – 1909, is the only major work dedicated solely
to the events in question itself.[3]
Although it would be disingenuous to state Schmitt has blocked out the Great
War from his mind whilst writing this book, he takes the most pains to examine
the evidence within their contemporary context without tying it to the fallout
from the Sarajevo assassination.
Schmitt’s narrative is
the best attempt to digest and analyze the complete diplomatic documents
published mostly in the 1920s and 1930s. In the immediate aftermath of the war,
the belligerent governments scrambled to produce diplomatic papers that
corroborated their version of events in an attempt to garner sympathy and
support at the Paris Peace Conference. The results were not only one-sided and
sorely lacking in completeness; they also only concentrated on the immediate
aftermath of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. After the more complete
publication of the British documents, the Austro-Hungarian documents, and the
massive German documents that covered the period from 1871 to 1914, Schmitt
keyed in on the Bosnia events as pivotal to the underlying antagonisms of the
war. His book details the actions and correspondence of all parties during the
crisis from start to finish.
In contrast to Fay,
Schmitt places a lot of emphasis on the terse message Bülow’s deputy,
Kiderlen-Wächter delivers to Isvolsky;
the “ultimatum.” Though he hedges in the interpretation for the reasons behind
Kiderlen’s wording, the implication clearly places onus upon this action by
Germany that humiliated Russia.[4]
Schmitt does not provide detailed analysis on the British diplomatic actions,
though he does go into detail in the narrative of events.
Though Albertini, Fay,
and Schmitt are the most authoritative historians on the subject, and most
frequently cited by subsequent authors, other writers have provided some insight
to the crisis. David Herrmann’s work looks at the origins of the war from a
military perspective. While extensive scholarship has examined the role of the
naval armaments race between Germany and Britain, little had previously been
devoted upon the land armies of the belligerents of August 1914. Herrmann fills
the 1904 to 1914 void by analyzing military attaché reports, appropriations
from the various legislatures, technological advances, training and tactics
from the period, and the interrelationships between the army chiefs and their
political masters.[5]
Concerning the Bosnia affair, Herrmann concentrates on the role the political
unrest from the 1905 revolution and the weakness of Russia’s military played
during the crisis. Herrmann starts his chapter on the annexation with a speech
from the Duma in June 1908 in which an Octobrist party leader excoriated the
readiness of the Russian military.[6]
The humiliation Russia received from the 1905 war with Japan demonstrated the
technological, tactical, and numerical inferiority of the Russian Army.
Hermmann contends this public speech in combination other sources, among them
reports gleaned from military attachés, was a primary buttress for Ährenthal’s
offensive pivot in foreign affairs and encouraged Germany’s firm resolve to
call Isvolsky’s bluff in March 1909.[7]
Hermmann does not provide any unique insight to the British role.
Bobroff looks at the
Russian role in Great Power politics during the time period.[8]
But his volumes is devoted primarily to the greater Russian ambition towards
Turkey and the opening of the Bosphorus straights. He also provides no
significant insight to the British mediation of the crisis. Others like Sean
McMeekin, Hugh Ragsdale, and Samuel Williamson provide their analytic takes
mostly on the subject of war guilt for the Great War.[9]
Though they are informative volumes from a lofty perspective, they as well
provide little insight into the British mediation efforts.
D. W. Sweet makes the
claim that the newly formed liberal British government’s primary concern was
the support of the Young Turks and their revolutionary government.[10]
While not anymore dependent upon the protection of Turkey against the Russian
naval threat against the Mediterranean, they understood that the British
protection of what the Muslim world still held to be the caliphate was key in
their maintenance of their interests in Egypt, the Middle East, and India.
Sweet makes it clear the later squabble between Russian and Austria concerning
Serbia’s discontent was of little concern to Grey and the Foreign Office.[11]
Grey was content having secured the Austro-Turkish settlement.
Cooper describes
Britain’s accidental deterrence in the early months following the annexation as
more compelling than the concerted efforts undertaken by the diplomatic corps
in February and March 1909. The presence of the British warships in the Aegean
near Turkey deterred the Austro-Hungarian navy from disrupting the Turkish
boycott of Austrian goods that forced the Dual Monarchy to grant more severe
economic concessions than previously planned. Austria-Hungary was convinced
Britain had deployed the vessels deliberately to provoke this outcome, when in
reality it was to protect Crete from a potential Greek invasion.[12]
This essay will explore
the British diplomatic efforts of mediation in detail. This will provide a
greater understanding of the British perspective of the crisis. Where some
historians have provided a blow-by-blow chronology of events and others a
broader panorama, none has adequately explored the British perspective.
Chapter 1 – The Historical Background
The Franco-Prussian War and Bismarck’s Balancing Act
The concert of Europe
from 1815 until the outbreak of World War I was a period of nearly
unprecedented peace in Europe. Save the war in the Crimea in the 1850s, no
great conflict involving three or more of the powers erupted throughout these
100 years. The Metternich system of conference and mediation largely worked. A
delicate balance between the powers of Russia, France, Britain, the Hapsburg
Empire, and Ottoman Turkey was largely maintained. How the system came crashing
down in the early Twentieth Century is still widely debated. Whether one takes
a Marxist interpretation of rampant capitalism and imperialism or of
governmental failures in realistic diplomacy and ambition, one key fact
remains. The latter half of the Nineteenth Century experienced a dramatic shift
in balance with the rise and decline of power-players in the halls of European
power.
Germany’s rise from
mediocrity to continental hegemon was meteoric. Prussia had played a bit part
in continental power-politics since the days of Frederick the Great, yet most
of Prussia’s role was on a regional level, whether engaging Austria in
domination over middle and eastern Europe, or in the struggle to free Europe
from Bonaparte’s clutches. Prussia’s limited foreign policy changed when
Bismarck came to power in the mid Nineteenth Century. Bismarck exploited the
nascent nationalism of the German states and subordinated liberalism in order
to shore up the Prussian monarchy. He also provided a solution to the Kleindeutsch/Großdeutsch question
through wars with the Habsburgs over the middle and lower German states.
Finally, Bismarck opportunistically picked a fight with France in 1870 over the
subject of Spanish succession. The victory in the Franco-Prussian war signified
an end to Bismarck’s ambitions. The Hohenzollern king, Wilhelm I was offered
the crown and title of Kaiser of the new German Empire under Prussian
dominance.
This dramatic
ascendency severely altered the balance of power in Europe. France remained
embittered against Germany, but was severely weakened and politically isolated.
Britain maintained her splendid isolation but kept a wary eye on the balance of
continental power. Russia and Germany continued their friendship. Satiated,
Bismarck’s foreign policy tacked from adventurism to maintaining the course of
the status quo. The powers, aside from France, albeit concerned about this
upstart newcomer, took Bismarck at his word, accepting his “intent” rather than
viewing the Prussian ascendency as a threat to their interests.[13]
Knowing all too well the
French desire for revanche, Bismarck
concentrated his foreign policy efforts on keeping France politically isolated while
holding on to hope for future friendly relations.[14]
To that end, the League of the Three Emperors was formed between Germany,
Russia, and Austria. Germany kept France politically isolated, a weakened Austria
gained a crucial ally, and Russia continued her friendship and advanced her
mutual aims of cooperation in Poland with Germany.[15]
There was concurrent to
this rise of German power, a continued decline of power and control in the
Balkans and areas of Ottoman control in southeastern Europe. The foundering
Ottoman Empire who had turned to brutal oppression of Orthodox subjects, a
weakened Austria, the rise of Slavic nationalism, and overlapping interest with
the Russian Empire sowed seeds of discord in the Dreikaiserbund.[17]
This culminated in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 in which Russia brought the
Ottomans to terms in less than a year. The Concert of Europe did not accept the
subsequent bilateral treaty of San Stefano, and Bismarck forced Russia and
Austria to the table at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.[18]
The subsequent Treaty of Berlin addressed the areas of dispute the other powers
had over the San Stefano accord to include granting occupation and
administration rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Sanjak of
Novibazaar to Austria-Hungary.[19]
Though the treaty secured
large concessions for Russia at the expense of the Ottomans, Russia remained
embittered that while she had waged the war and negotiated the terms, she only
achieved little of the spoils, while Germany openly gifted the Dual Monarchy
holdings within the Balkans.[20]
This marked a significant turning point in Russian-Austrian relations. The
fallout from the Russo-Turkish war ended the Dreikaiserbund in 1878, but ushered in what was to be “the very
foundation rock of German policy”: the Dual Alliance between Austria-Hungary
and Germany.[21]
Although tensions
remained between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the outcome of what could happen
should their cooperation turn to belligerence kept the unlikely collaborators
tied together. To Bismarck, the prospect of Russia or Austria-Hungary seeking
an ally in the form of France was unconscionable to the cornerstone of his
foreign policy, and the threat of Britain to Russian interests overrode her
regional concerns of Austria-Hungary and Russia. Bismarck’s delicate balancing
act therefore continued when Russia agreed to sign a defensive alliance with
Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1881.[22]
This Alliance of the Three Emperors satisfied the defensive concerns of all
parties from perceived threats during its duration. However, the regional tension
caused by the continued decline of Ottoman strength and the increasing
discontent of the Slavic peoples proved too strong to keep Austria-Hungary and
Russia together.[23]
The treaty expired in 1887 and was not renewed.
Bismarck’s delicate
balance began to crash around him, in part by securing an unlikely ally in
Italy with the signing of the 1882 Triple Alliance between Germany,
Austria-Hungary and Italy.[24]
He had hoped to secure allies whose mutual antagonisms and suspicions were only
outweighed by fear of others. Italy proved to be an unstable ally as her
behavior would prove during periods of crisis. The death of Bismarck’s primary
benefactor, the Kaiser Wilhelm I in 1888, followed quickly by the passing of
Wilhelm I’s son, Frederick III proved to be a turning point in Great Power
relations.
Bismarck’s Dismissal and the European Split
When Wilhelm II
ascended to the throne in 1888, Bismarck was already an old man whose influence
had begun to wane. With a fresh ear to bend and an ambitious new sovereign, political
advisor to the Foreign Office, Baron Friedrich von Holstein pressured Wilhelm
II to oppose Bismarck who, sensing the seismic shift in the direction of German
foreign policy, resigned in 1890.[25]
The Holstein-influenced Wilhelm felt the maintenance of the tenuous relationship
between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia was not worth the risk of
embarrassment should any of the details of the various secret treaties slip
out. Holstein saw it a form of “political bigamy” and urged Wilhelm to adopt a
policy of Austria-first in the alliance structure.[26]
The dismissal of Bismarck effectively signaled the end of the delicate balance
of power in Europe. His efforts had ensured France remained isolated
diplomatically, and his maintenance of the status-quo and non-expansionist policies
kept Britain relatively comfortable in her splendid isolation. The ambitious
governments to follow under Wilhelm II changed this tenor. The Triple Alliance,
with special emphasis of supporting Austria-Hungary, became the singular
influence in polarizing Europe into separate camps in the run-in to the Great
War.
The continued crumble
of the Ottoman Empire and the efforts to prop up a declining Austro-Hungarian
Empire exacerbated the ever-present tensions between Russia and the Hapsburg
monarchy. Added to this, the nationalism that sprang up in the wake of the
Ottoman decline threatened to be the spark that ignited this powder keg. As the
Ottomans tried to hold on, they ruthlessly squashed all demonstrations of
Slavic nationalism in their lands.
Germany having let her
reinsurance treaty with Russia lapse in 1890, effectively left Russia
completely isolated.[27]
With the now-prevalent belief that an alliance with Austria-Hungary was
mutually exclusive to one with Russia, Bismarck’s great fear: Russia allied
with a France still seeking revanche
for Sedan, started to take shape. France, seeing Russia now isolated, sensed an
opportunity to ally herself to Russia in order to protect herself. The Entente
between the two was worked out in 1891 and 1892.[28]
This Entente seemed at
the time to be partially aimed at Britain, as her historical enemy had nearly
always been France, and the proximity of Russia to her near-Asian colonial
holdings ensured a constant state of heightened tensions. But the change in
tenor of Germany’s new foreign policy as announced by Wilhelm and his
chancellor, Bülow spoke of an
expansionism overseas; one in direct competition with British naval interests.
Due to the subsequent naval program of Admiral Tirpitz, Britain’s splendid isolation
came to an end.[29]
At first Britain looked to ally herself with Germany, yet the talks faltered
with both parties seeking to hedge their bets by refusing to fully back the
other. Both looked at the alternatives of France and Russia as potential fallback
positions. Since Britain fancied herself as the imperial master of Europe, and
Germany had ambitions to depose her, both were reluctant to act jointly. This
prospect was completely doomed when Britain became entangled in the Boer War in
her South Africa colony with Germany very publically and vociferously backing
the Teutonic Boers.[30]
Britain thereafter
looked to France and Russia as potential suitors. The first protocol, the Entente Cordiale was signed between
France and Britain in which the two parties came to an understanding on the
subject of overseas colonies, preeminently of them Egypt and Morocco. France
agreed not to interfere with British presence in Egypt, which administered the
vital Suez Canal, and Britain promised to support the French presence in
Morocco. This agreement was signed in 1904, and was soon put to the test during
the first Moroccan crisis in 1905.[31]
In a foreshadowing of the Bosnian crisis three years later, trilateral
agreements between France, Britain, and Italy . . . the latter of which
received free reign in Tripoli . . . were signed without any input from
Germany, who felt her economic interests within Egypt, and especially Morocco,
were negatively impacted by the pact.[32]
Following the
agreement, the Kaiser himself steamed into Tangier to meet with the Moroccan
sultan in a show of Germany’s interest in maintaining the independent nature of
Morocco. This precipitated a crisis in which Germany found herself isolated and
the victim of a public relations nightmare that made her look like a
war-mongering aggressor. The fallout essentially formalized ties between
Britain and France while severely weakening the German and Italian ones.[33]
With an understanding
now reached with France, Britain could then look to other areas to buttress her
colonial holdings. The relationship with the Ottomans, which had historically been
well, had deteriorated in the climate of brutal repression of Christian
minorities in the Slavic and Balkan holdings of the formerly prestigious
Empire. Germany took advantage of Britain’s disengagement with the Ottomans by
heavily pursuing economic interests in the Middle East to include the Baghdad
railway. With the combination of mutual interests in countering the German
incursion and reforming Ottoman rule, Britain seized the opportunity to create
an understanding with Russia; one that was formalized in 1907.[34]
Though Germany still
made efforts towards more favorable relationships with Russia and Britain, the
polarization of the Great Powers had begun. The Triple Entente was formed as a
reaction to Bülow’s abandonment
of Bismarckian foreign policy.[35]
Britain, France, and Russia now looked warily upon Wilhelm’s ambition.
Buchlau and the Announcement of the Annexation
Following diplomatic
postings at the Vatican, Munich, Tokyo, and Copenhagen, Alexander Isvolsky took
the position of Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire in May 1906 at the same
time as the seating of the first Russian Duma.[36]
Isvolsky came “highly recommended” by King Edward VII and had been an opponent
of the recent war with Japan.[37]
Isvolsky had a goal of refocussing Russian foreign policy on near eastern
affairs and restoring the prestige of Russia following the war debacle. He
planned an aggressive program with a goal of opening the Bosporus straights to
Russian warships.[38]
Previously, this end was considered untenable due to unfriendly relations with
Britain, but following the Franco-Anglo agreement in 1904, which secured the
British interest in Egypt and the Suez, the time seemed ripe for Russia to
bring up the question of the Straights with Britain.[39]
According to Harold
Nicolson, Ambassador Nicolson’s son and biographer, Isvolsky was a classical
Slavic romantic and idealist who was out of touch with the mainstream of
contemporary Slavic romanticism. Isvolsky saw Russia’s role as the protector of
Slavic Eastern Orthodoxy, and Constantinople as the center of gravity for the
church. From his career in foreign diplomacy, however, Isvolsky failed to
appreciate the enormity and building inertia of the emergent Slavic nationalism
in Russian circles.[41]
“The emotions of Russia were no longer centered upon the Church of St. Sophia
or upon the revival of the old Byzantine Empire. They were centered upon the
Slav races in the Balkans and upon the protection of these races against the
oncoming tide of Teutonism.”[42]
Count Alois Lexa von Ährenthal was Isvolsky’s
counterpart in Vienna. Ährenthal had previously been posted
to St. Petersburg as the Dual Monarchy’s ambassador to the Tsar. He had a
reputation for shrewd aggression amongst allies and for unscrupulous behavior
in Russian circles. His biographer says his diplomacy, “composed more of hard arrogance and dissolvent intrigue than of prudent
reserve and ingratiating souplesse,
was a mixture of pretension and subtlety, of force and ruse, of realism and cynicism:
his readiness to cheat, to circumvent, to outwit hid a harsh and ruthless
will.”[43] The German Foreign
Minister von Schön
called him “ultra-conservative” and “well acquainted with the aims and
practices of Russian policy.”[44] Ährenthal
was “one of a group of younger noblemen who deeply resented the subordinate
position of the Dual Monarchy in the affairs of Europe, he hoped to conduct an
aggressive foreign policy aimed at ending the irritating dependence on
Germany.”[45]
Ährenthal’s initial goal was to revive the Dreikaiserbund, to achieve a revival of Austro-Hungarian
prestige, and end “the irritating dependence upon Germany.”[47]
A clear step toward achieving this end was to expand Austro-Hungarian interest
in the Balkans, shoring up their rule in the ethnically diverse areas that she
controlled. This hope was shattered by
the disclosure of the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 and was replaced by a
pragmatic policy of diffusing tensions within the Balkans. Due to Ährenthal’s
studious knowledge of Russian goals and the timing of the Young Turk
revolution, Ährenthal played on Isvolsky’s discussions with him concerning
regional affairs, enticing him with a potential quid-pro-quo on the question of
the Straights.
In September of 1907, heady with confidence
over his securing the British Entente, which had defused Anglo-Russian tensions
in the Middle East, Isvolsky went to Vienna to meet Ährenthal. Since 1904, Isvolsky
had been trying to force the issue of the Dardanelles with any Great Power that
would listen. He unsuccessfully tried to bend the ear of Britain’s Edward VII
at Copenhagen when he was the ambassador to Denmark and again unsuccessfully
attempted during the Entente negotiations with Britain in 1907.[48] The sticking point with
Britain stemmed from questions of the lack of agreements and consultations with
all of the powers and later in 1908, the desire not to inject unnecessary
agitation into the fledgling Young Turk revolutionary government.[49]
During the informal discussions with Ährenthal,
Isvolsky mentioned the question of the Dardanelles. He stated the Russian
desire to open them to her war ships was an even higher priority now that she
had lost her port to the Pacific at Port Arthur. Ährenthal, quickly recognizing
an opportunity to advance his agenda of pulling the southern Slavs under the
wing of the Dual Monarchy, responded with the possibility of formally annexing
Bosnia-Herzegovina.[50] Isvolsky demonstrated
verbal support for this arrangement and the two went their separate ways.
Following the Vienna meeting in November,
Ährenthal brought up the subject of annexation to Army Chief of Staff Conrad
von Hötzendorf. Hötzendorf saw this as a tremendous opportunity to quell
uprising within the province and urged immediacy.[51] Ährenthal wished to use
the subject of the Sandžak of Novibazar to sweeten the deal for the Russians. Under
the 1885 Treaty of Berlin, Austria-Hungary was charged with not only occupying
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also this small province which was also under titular
control of the Ottomans. In this aspect Ährenthal and the Austrian Chief of the
General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf clashed. Von Hötzendorf viewed the small
strip separating Montenegro from Serbia as a defense against pan-Slavic
aspirations and as a fail-safe path to the Aegean, while Ährenthal saw the
Sandžak as a somewhat meaningless piece of land but withdrawing its military
forces as a highly symbolic gesture of Austria’s intentions of no further
designs of expansion.[52]
In January 1908, after attaining consent from his home government to
pursue the military abandonment of the Sandžak, Ährenthal publically announced
designs for a railway transecting the same Sandžak.[54] This sparked the
beginning of misunderstandings and conflict. The Russians interpreted this move
as duplicitous in intent; signaling an Austrian desire to encircle Serbia. While
Albertini opines Ährenthal proposed the line so as “to enhance the value of
this renunciation in the eyes of the Great Powers,” the Russian perspective on
this point seems more accurate in that one of the intentions of Austria was in
fact to isolate Serbia from potential expansion.[55] Foreshadowing of the
following year, Isvolsky found in this announcement of the railway project by Ährenthal,
which had not been discussed in the negotiations the year previous, that the
Austrian “had not acted straightforwardly.”[56] May opines Isvolsky, in a
nod to the Slavic furor that could erupt politically within Russia, merely
protested as to the nature of Ährenthal’s announcement.[57]
On July 2, 1908 Isvolsky penned a letter to Ährenthal
that expressed Russian consent to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
exchange for Austria’s expression of
support for the opening of the Dardanelles to Russian war ships.[58] In doing so, Isvolsky
committed a diplomatic blunder of an almost unprecedented scale; effectively
granting Austria concessions while receiving nothing tangible in return.
As Ährenthal’s plans developed, in July 1908 an event happened which
threatened to forestall the intentions of both Austria and Russia. The cancer
of the sick man of Europe suddenly went into remission in the form of the Young
Turk revolution. The accompanying reforms and positive, ambitious outlook of
the Committee of Union and Progress worried Ährenthal that the reforming Turks
may find renewed support of several of the Great Powers and undermine the
design to wrest away Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, let alone the topic of
the Straights.[60]
On September 16 1908, Isvolsky met with
Ährenthal at Buchlau castle in Monrovia to discuss the issues of the
annexation, the withdrawal from the Sandžak, and the Bosporus Straights.[61] From here, unfortunately,
all that remains is the written account of Ährenthal as Isvolsky did not take
notes on the deliberations.
In concert with his plans to annex
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ährenthal also hinted strongly to Sofia to declare her
independence from the Turks. Ährenthal believed having Bulgaria proclaim her
independence would overshadow the measly matter of annexing a de-facto province
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This being done, the Bulgarians jumped the gun
on Ährenthal and proclaimed their independence on October 5. This annoyed Austrian
foreign minister greatly, forcing him to move up his timeline by a few days,
and made the announcement of the annexation the same day.[62]
This hit the international community unexpectedly,
being less than a month after Buchlau, and before Isvolsky had spoken with
France and Britain. Stunned by the announcement, Isvolsky suddenly found
himself under fire from the British and French, who were not amiable to the bilateral
nature of the deal, and especially from the Serbs who viewed the annexation as
a threat to their sovereignty.[63]
The conference of Buchlau is one of the
mysteries found in history. Precisely what wording was used during the meeting
is lost with varying interpretations existing between eminent historians like
Albertini, Fay, Fleming, and Schmitt. It is a shame that Isvolsky’s death
interrupted his plan to write details of the Bosnia affair that are now hidden
to history.[64] Indeed,
the lack of documentation of the negotiations between Ährenthal and Isvolsky
from the Russian point of view leaves us only with Ährenthal’s version of the
story. Though Ährenthal and Isvolsky’s accounts following the conference
differ, it is likely that Isvolsky was unaware of the timing of the annexation
and was purposefully kept in the dark by Ährenthal.[65]
It is clear that there was a divide in at least the explanation from
both sides. Isvolsky maintained the terms negotiated at Buchlau were to be
subject to the ratification of the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin as these
changes necessitated significant revisions to the document. Ährenthal agreed to
the need for a conference of nations to apply revisions but claimed he told Isvolsky
the subject of the annexation was to be off the table and a settled matter. It
is hard to believe Isvolsky agreed to such a statement or even had the
authority from the Tsar to make it but Isvolsky could never produce any
documentation presenting his side of the story while Ährenthal could produce
his official documentation of the events that took place on September 16.
Ährenthal knew Russia's weakness; her fear of revolution. He
correctly assessed the egoism and ambition of Isvolsky. He was aware of the
weakness, ineptitude, and the paralyzing indecision of Nicholas II.
Furthermore, the German fear of a policy of encirclement fostered by Great
Britain had been aroused by the conferences at Algeciras and Reval. Ährenthal gambled
that Germany would not abandon her only reliable European ally. It was a safe
bet. … Ährenthal duped Isvolsky, humiliated the Russian Empire, and seized from
Germany the diplomatic initiative which Bismarck had preserved so jealously.[66]
The Immediate Effects
The October 5 1908 announcement by Francis Joseph of the formal
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent shockwaves from Sarajevo to Moscow,
from Skopje to London, from Belgrade to Paris. Serbia’s close ally and Jugoslav aspirant Montenegro angrily
rejected the land-grab and announced it would no longer abide by Article 29 of
the Berlin treaty which limited its sovereignty on its coastline with the
Adriatic.[67] Cetinje
made its own formal list of demands and delivered them to Isvolsky to be presented
at the assumed upcoming European Conference to negotiate the changes. These
included a rescinding of the annexation, a deletion of Article 29, and other
small territorial changes to Montenegro’s benefit.[68]
France had been forewarned of the announcement
by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. Having assumed Isvolsky had already
communicated the agreements reached at Buchlau, Count Khevenhüller, the
ambassador, relayed the news of the imminent annexation to the French
government. In the relaying of the message, Khevenhüller, allayed French
worries by stating the initiative had “the concurrence of the Cabinets of St.
Petersburg, Berlin, and Rome.”[69] With this assurance that
her allies were satisfied, France, with the exception of Prime Minister
Clemenceau reacted in a rather apathetic manner.
Shortly after the French notification, the
Quai d’Orsay notified Britain as well.[70] Britain was not so much
concerned by the actual event as much as to the damage done to the new Turkish
government that it backed. Britain equally did not wish to offend its new
partner Russia in the very beginning of their new-found warm relationship. They
swiftly issued a demarche to Vienna expressing their concern for the method
used in securing this annexation and further concern for the future state of
treaties if they could be re-written with secret negotiations of a minority of
parties.[71]
Yet Britain never considered going to war to protect the egos of the Russians,
or the insult upon the Turks. It hoped to keep the peace and the status quo of
the understandings developed.
The Germans supported the annexation but the
Kaiser was incensed it had been made without consultation with him. Since
Bismarck, the hallmark of German foreign policy was to keep France weak and out
of alliance with another foreign power. Since Bismarck’s dismissal, the
collapse of Austro-Russian relations, and the Triple Entente, the German policy
morphed into rupturing these alliances. It is a logical conclusion that
severely damaging Russian interests in the Balkans without having an active
hand therein would serve to severely strain the ties between London, Paris, and
St. Petersburg. Certainly, Bülow and Wilhelm knew the French would not go to
war over the Slavic question and saw this as an opportunity to support an ally
whilst simultaneously showing France’s unsteady nature as a military ally.
It is a testament to Isvolsky’s amateur
handling of the entire affair that official Russian sentiment from St.
Petersburg was against the annexation that Isvolsky had reportedly assented to.
The Russian Prime Minister Stolypin and Nicholas II both rejected the
annexation outright. It was such a rejection that Stolypin threatened
resignation.[72]
It is unclear if Isvolsky acted on his own accord at Buchlau and negotiated
away concessions he had no right to or if Ährenthal had cleverly manipulated
statements from Isvolsky he never intended to make. Indeed, the Russian narrative
itself is not consistent. There exist conflicting stories about Nicholas II’s
foreknowledge and agreement to the affair.[73]
After the announcement, Turkey was
understandably miffed. In one fell stroke, she had lost nominal control of the
provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Bulgaria. Yet, she was pragmatic enough
to understand that her only recourse lay not in the force of arms, but in
appealing to the Great Powers for either redress or compensation. Britain
advised as much with Grey instructing Ambassador Lowther to inform the Porte of
Britain’s and France’s “moral support” and to await redress at a conference.[74] “After the first feelings
of indignation had died down, the Porte took the position that while it was
prepared to reconcile itself with the fait
accompli in Bosnia . . . it must be compensated for the loss of the
Bulgarian tribute.”[75] Faced with this demand
and knowing that the subject of Bosnia would likely arise in any European
Conference forced by the issue of Bulgaria, the Dual Monarchy along with
Bulgaria came to terms of monetary compensation to be paid to Turkey for the
territories. The private manner in which the compensation question happened
kept the Turkish demand for a conference off the table, further enhancing the
status of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s annexation as a fait accompli.
Serbia had the largest outcry. Scores of demonstrators in the streets of
Belgrade hurled invective at Vienna. Stuck between the rock of possible
revolution and the hard place of unintentionally provoking Austrian military
response, the Serbian government mobilized its reserve military to deal with
the unrest.[76]
The Serbian parliament passed resolutions condemning the action, secured war
bonds as insurance, and created something that played a major part in the
events of 1914. Schmitt describes it thusly:
In the light of subsequent history, however, the most
important incident of these days was the establishment of the society called Narodna
Odbrana [“National Defence”], “which should protect and promote our
interests in the annexed provinces” … it was to the alleged activities of this
organization that the Austro-Hungarian government ascribed the revolutionary
ferment in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was mad the basis for the ultimatum of 23
July 1914.[77]
In the months following the announcement, Serbia increased the heated
rhetoric, demanding Bosnia be given its independence and demanding territorial
compensation for herself. Belgrade continued to make appropriations for war
funding and incorporated their new army recruits four months early.[78]
Between November of 1908 and February of 1909, the powers worked
diplomatically to find a way to resolve the issues that the annexation and
independence of Bulgaria presented to the Treaty of Berlin. Concurrently,
tensions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia boiled and reached a critical point
in February. Throughout this, Britain, France, and Germany looked upon the
crisis with concern but were unwilling to step in themselves to solve the
crisis backed by military force. Germany of course, was in favor of the outcome
of the announcement while Britain and France were mainly concerned for the
continuation of peaceful relations in the region and that Turkey received fair treatment.
Chapter 2 – The British Mediation Effort
As the tensions between
Austria and Serbia mounted, and as the pan-Slavic press increased its rancor
towards Isvolsky, he began to lose composure. A December article in the St.
Petersburg Novoe Vremya disclosed the
fact that Isvolsky had informed the Serbian premier Milovanovitch of the
impending annexation in September, prior to the official announcement, and
advised the Serbian government to do nothing. This incensed the press which
pushed for the overthrow of the government.[79]
On January 30, the German ambassador to the Court at St. Petersburg Friedrich
Pourtalès used the term
“hysterical woman” to describe Isvolsky’s temperament and asked Isvolsky not to
dwell on the personal issues with Ährenthal.
Pourtalès was convinced that
the Russian pressure on Serbia to take peaceful measures would successfully
mediate the crisis.[80]
The February 9th
through 12th visit of King Edward VII, Queen Alexandra, and Sir
Charles Hardinge, the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry, sparked
a significant change in Isvolsky’s behavior. The day after the visit the
Russian Foreign Minister begged Ambassador Nicolson, for British mediation
efforts. Isvolsky, acting upon information “he had received from other sources”
stated that Austria-Hungary was preparing to invade Serbia.[81]
Isvolsky further believed that Britain had aligned herself to Germany’s and
Austria’s views of the Serbian problem with the annexation effectively
isolating Russia.[82]
It is unknown what specifically was dispatched to Isvolsky from the Tsar’s
ambassador to Berlin, Osten-Sacken regarding regarding Hardinge’s meeting, as
that record does not exist. The ambassador to London, Benckendorff had, only
days before, written Isvolsky passing on Hardinge’s own assurances that Britain was fully supportive of Serbia’s quest
for compensation, albeit stating unequivocally that territorial concessions or
Bosnian-Herzegovinian independence was impossible without waging war.[83]
The German account of the
meeting between Hardinge and Bülow
did not contain any indication consistent in Isvolsky’s interpretation of
events. In what seemed a quite congenial meeting, Bülow only noted that he was pleased the English and German
governments seemed to be approaching a common understanding on the topic of the
settlement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Bülow and Hardinge agreed that territorial compensation could not
happen without a war, with Hardinge suggesting economic compensation as a
possible alternative.[85]
Hardinge’s account of the meeting was much more detailed but did not differ
from Bülow’s. In his narrative,
Bülow claimed territorial
compensation would not occur and that it was “a point of honor” with Franz
Joseph, as well as stating Bülow
was open to discussing economic compensation.[86]
Hardinge does note Bülow
mentioned concern at the possibility of Austrian military action to defend
against irregular Serb incursion.
The Austrian Government [was]
becoming exasperated by the provocative attitude of the Servian Government, and
that even the Emperor was losing patience. If, in the event of Servian bands
crossing the Bosnian frontier, it became necessary for the Austrian Government
to undertake punitive measures against Servia, it would be very desirable that
Austria should previously declare that she would respect her independence;
otherwise the situation created for Russia would be one of extreme difficulty.[87]
In assenting to this
potentiality, Hardinge also asked if Germany would be willing to press upon Austria
the importance of publically supporting Serbia’s independence and territorial
integrity if that were to take place. Bülow’s
reply of “it would be difficult for Germany to act alone” must have invited
Hardinge to press for British mediation.[88]
Hardinge noted that
dealing with this matter would be difficult:
The situation [is] more difficult
and complicated [due to] the personal animosity prevailing between Baron Ährenthal and M. Isvolsky, which
rendered the position of Germany as the ally of Austria and the traditional
friend of Russia a very delicate one. In spite of what M. Isvolsky might now
say, there is no doubt that he had compromised himself at Buchlau, and, having
miscalculated the attitude of the Russian press, had waived his objections to
the annexation in the hope of obtaining definite assurances from Baron Ährenthal on the question of the
Dardanelles.[89]
Although Bülow seemed hopeful of an amicable
end to the crisis, he did portend Germany’s eventual action in stating that the
“Russian Government . . . fully realize that they are quite unprepared for war,
and that war could only be to the interest of the revolutionaries in Russia.”[90]
Only a few days before
Nicolson’s dispatch to Grey inviting a British mediation effort, the German
government seemed open to an Entente power taking the initiative in attempting
to lead negotiations. In an internal note on the day of the British royal
visit, von Schön, not wishing
to be perceived as abandoning her ally, discussed the possibility of this
taking place so long as Germany did not take the first step.[91]
The Russian Foreign
Ministry sought to quiet the Austrian newspapers’ sensationalism by disclosing
a dispatch to the Neue Freie Presse a
telegram providing governmental assurances that there were no marauding
irregulars in Serbia poised to threaten Austro-Hungarian interests, reiterating
that the Serbian Foreign Minister Milovanovitch would continue a peaceful
policy, and buttressing the claims of the Dual Monarchy by agreeing that there
should be no cause for Serbian unrest as the annexation did not affect the
rights of Serbia.[92]
Although Isvolsky’s
source is not known, newspapers did corroborate the belief that Austria was
weeks away from military action. The February 11 edition of the Viennese Neue Freie Presse had called on the
Serbian King Peter to “beware the Ides of March” and that “the time will come
when Austria-Hungary will no longer be able to tolerate in her neighborhood
conditions such as these prevailing in Serbia.”[93]
The paper posited that the crisis presented an “existential question” to the
Serbian people.[94]
Also supportive of Isvolsky’s fears, on the very day Isvolsky met with
Nicolson, the Austro-Hungarian Army Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorff informed Ährenthal that he planned, with the
concurrence of the War Minister, planned send 15,000 soldiers to reinforce
Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though this action was vetoed by Ährenthal, the soldiers were prepared
should a contingency necessitating their use arise.[95]
The British Foreign
Office felt at this time compelled to intervene. Up until now, they had
provided insight and advice to all parties in the affair throughout normal
diplomatic discourse, but they had refrained from attempting to direct the
parties on opposite sides to a peaceful conclusion. On the 16th,
Hardinge wrote Nicolson, “As we feel that we cannot leave things to chance, we
are taking the initiative in proposing to act with France as mediators in this
conflict. I am not very hopeful as to the result, owing to the inflated demands
of Servia and Montenegro and the stinginess of Ährenthal.”[96]
Grey’s immediate goal
was to stave off an Austrian invasion of Serbia, whether provoked or not. To
this end, he first proposed Germany join with France and Britain to meet in
Vienna to forge a peaceful resolution. Since Hardinge had just met with Bülow in Berlin and listened to his
assurances that Germany did not wish the dispute to escalate to war, Grey
wished to put this desire to a test.[97]
Germany’s position as sole benefactor to Austria-Hungary in the position in
which she found herself would virtually ensure a peaceful solution.
On February 19, Grey
sent telegrams to the French, German, and Italian governments outlining his
proposal for mediation. He expressed his fear . . . a trait incidentally, that conservatives
would highlight for years to come[99]
. . . that Austria may attack Serbia and asking for their support in a
mediation effort aimed at Vienna. Grey wished to find out “what concessions she
is prepared to make” in order to reach an amicable conclusion to the crisis.[100]
The Russians agreed to this approach but had no confidence in the efficacy of
the plan. Isvolsky was completely convinced that Austria would invade Serbia
and any mediation efforts done in Vienna would be futile.[101]
And while the French immediately signed on to this course of action Grey’s
effort naturally ran afoul with the Italians and Germans.
The Italians refused
to go along with the proposal without first consulting their allies Germany.[102]
In Germany, upon receipt of Grey’s plan, Bülow had immediately consulted Wilhelm emphasizing the need to
stand by their ally, and proposed they inform Britain that although they shared
the same goal of avoiding a conflict between Serbia and Austria, they could not
agree with Grey’s proposal, and highlighted the belligerent behavior of the
Serbians whose “provocations” were responsible for the specter of war.[103]
Bülow’s calculation was that
Germany was at this moment diplomatically forced to throw support unequivocally
behind Austria-Hungary. As in Algeciras, Italy, could not be counted upon if
the crisis were submitted to a general conference between the powers.[104]
With the Moroccan humiliation still fresh in mind, Bülow was loathe to stray from Ährenthal’s plan to proceed bilaterally with the Serbians.
Ährenthal viewed the annexation
matter as strictly between signatories of the original Berlin treaty. While the
opinions of periphery powers like Germany, Britain, and Russia mattered, they
were not directly affected by the annexation itself. Furthermore, since Serbia
was not a signatory to the Berlin treaty, her rights were in no wise infringed.
Ährenthal wished to conclude
the direct negotiations with Turkey on the indemnities due them from the
annexation and independence of Bulgaria and then move on to discuss economic
matters directly with Serbia, all the while declaring the Dual Monarchy’s intent
to respect Serbia’s sovereignty and borders.[105]
When Goschen passed
Grey’s proposal to Foreign Minister von Schön on February 20, while making assurances Germany wished for a
peaceful conclusion as much did Britain, von Schön intimated that this plan would probably do more harm than good
as Austria-Hungary would interpret a collective attempt to be an effort to
bully Austria, placing undue pressure upon her, and that “Germany, Austria’s
ally, could not be a party to anything of that nature.”[106]
As to the mood in
Austria, it seems Ährenthal
was already informed of Grey’s plan prior to Grey receiving an
official answer from Germany.[107]
Ambassador Cartwright explained the sentiments of the missions posted at Vienna
were universally negative and that better results would be achieved should Grey
make a similar attempt to Serbia first.[108]
The prospects of
Grey’s first course of action looked bleak. Ambassador Goschen, without
receiving official word, passed on information from media sources that Germany
would decline and press for intervention through Belgrade rather than Vienna.[109]
And though there was disagreement between Lord Mallet and Hardinge as to the
direction and efficacy of this plan, Grey instructed the office that they must
wait on the official word from Germany.[110]
The expected arrived
on February 23, with Bülow
reading the official Imperial response to Grey’s plan to Ambassador Goschen.
“Any action having the object of removing the differences between
Austria-Hungary and Servia should, in [his Majesty’s government’s] opinion, be
taken at Belgrade rather than at Vienna. Provocation is, in effect, all on the
side of Servia.”[111]
The receipt of this
anticipated reply prompted sighs of quiet exasperation and dissension within
the foreign office as to the direction to take now. Lord Mallet did not believe
anything could come from approaching Vienna without the aid of Germany and
suspected, as did Isvolsky in St. Petersburg, that the reply was confirmation
that Austria-Hungary planned to act militarily against Serbia.[112]
Mallet was also not confident that a similar approach made to Belgrade would
garner the requisite Russian support to ameliorate Austro-Hungarian concerns
referenced in the German communique.[113]
Instead, Mallet mused the situation could be submitted to a general conference
of the powers, though his tone was not confident in the least. Hardinge took a
similar perspective, but expounded that confidential steps should be taken by
Britain to directly inquire of Vienna what concessions she would be willing to
grant Serbia for a peaceful end of the crisis, and upon failure of this
approach, turn to a conference.[114]
On the 24th,
Grey gave his reply to the German government. In it, he restated his case as to
why an approach should be made directly to Vienna, in that it would give them a
forum to explain what specific actions the Serbians have taken which threaten
Austria-Hungary, and what concessions Austria would be willing to grant Serbia
to arrive at a peaceful conclusion. This, Grey explained, would fulfil the
German desire of a mediation effort directed to Belgrade; one that would be
more informed and one that had a greater chance of Russian involvement.[115]
Concurrent with the
attempt to gain German support for directly approaching Vienna, French Foreign
Minister Pichon and Bülow’s
deputy Kiderlen were also working with Isvolsky to generate a circular
diplomatic notice for Serbia to distribute among the powers. Kiderlin
emphasized the difference between the powers first moving on Vienna as opposed
to Belgrade as simple but crucial. Kiderlen saw Grey’s plan as an attempt to
ask for concessions from Austria, while the German plan would ask Serbia what
her demands were.[116]
Isvolsky had impressed upon the Serbians the importance and gravity of their
predicament; that the clamor for war had been met with grim determination on
the part of the Dual Monarchy. He urged the Serbians to express an unequivocal
goal of peace and informed them British and Russian support would go so far as
economic measures; any aim of territorial concessions would not see support
from any of the powers.[117]
With Grey’s first
course of action of multi-lateral mediation with German participation aimed at
Vienna shot down, Grey and the foreign office moved to cooperate with the
French effort and the Kiderlen proposal directed toward Belgrade. Grey’s only
stipulation on this matter was the necessity of German assurances that they
would mediate on the Austrian side of the equation if Serbia would “renounce
their claims for territorial compensation” and make their economic demands
known.[118]
On February 26, the direct
negotiations between Vienna and Istanbul concluded and the expected Austro-Turkish
protocol was signed. Now that Turkey had been placated, this opened the door
for Ährenthal to directly deal
with the Serbian situation. Ährenthal
wasted no time in the matter. On March 2, Austrian ambassador, Count Mensdorff
informally discussed the Serbian issue with Grey. Grey informed Mensdorff of
the steps that Russia had been taking in conjunction with France and Germany to
impress upon Serbia the gravity of the situation and the need to cease the
calls for Bosnian-Herzegovinian independence and territorial compensations.
Mensdorff was pleased with it and, although unable to speak authoritatively on
the subject, intimated that should Serbia provide actual “moral” guarantees of
their passive intentions, “direct negotiations” with the Serbian government
would commence to discuss matters of economic concessions.[119]
This, as Grey pointed out, was a change from the assurances of last fall
wherein the Austrians had assured Britain of their desire to open the matter to
a general conference of the powers. Grey “despair[ed]” of this direct
negotiations achieved on points of form.[120]
Also following the
signing of the protocol, on March 1, the German ambassador, Metternich provided
Grey with a strange dispatch purportedly providing the very information he had
originally wished to receive through German interaction with Vienna: steps
taken by Serbia that would satisfy Austria. These steps were:
1.
A “complete change of Serbian Foreign Policy.
2.
“Disarmament.
3.
“Renunciation of compensation (not merely
territorial)
4.
“Readiness to accept whatever solution Austria
would offer.”[121]
The dispatch went on to explain that the official
opinion from members of the British and French Embassies was that “Germany was
now completely in lockstep with Ährenthal.”[122]
Bülow stated the information
had originated in a circular from the British mission in St. Petersburg and
based off information Foreign Minister Schön himself provided.[123]
Bülow openly doubted the
genuineness of this communique, as he was not aware of Schön making this statement to members
of the British or French missions in Berlin, nor to Pourtalés, the Germany minister in St.
Petersburg. Metternich explained that the Germans were concerned about this
sentiment emanating from the Nicolson-led mission and reiterated that the
German stance on the matter had not changed and that Germany had limited
herself to rejecting Grey’s proposal of approaching Vienna without having first
approached Serbia.[124]
After discussions back and forth between Britain,
France, Russia, and Serbia, on March 2, the Serbian cabinet agreed to the
necessity of renouncing territorial and economic claims.[125]
For the next three weeks, Isvolsky, Grey, and Pichon worked with the Serbians
in drafting the official declaration. A major sticking point with Serbia and
the Powers negotiating on her behalf concerned the subject of her armaments,
the size and disposition of her army, and the specific wording of the
memorandum that may give offense to Austria.[126]
Though the powers
muddled through these various niggling points, the subject of conference
remained the most contentious issue. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary were
quite aware of the risk they took should they submit to a conference without a
settled agenda. Still smarting from the abandonment of Italy at Algeciras,
Germany and Austria-Hungary did not wish to open themselves up to further
compromise and ensured Britain knew this stating that at a general conference
“it would be difficult to exclude discussion of Armenian, Cretan and Egyptian
questions,” topics which were contentious from a British perspective.[127]
In virtually every discussion of the Serbian note proposed to be handed to
Austria, the assurances that Serbia placed her concerns in the hands of the
signatory powers of the Treaty of Berlin played a highlighted role, the
implication being a conference to determine these concerns.[128]
Moreover, with every draft of the Serbian note, futher signals emerged of Ährenthal’s unwillingness to submit
to a conference, even with agreements reached upon the protocols.[129]
Ährenthal was determined
to treat the matter as a fait accompli
and deal with Serbia without interference from the other powers.[130]
Yet despite Ährenthal’s
intransigence, he was very appreciative of Russia’s, France’s, and Britain’s
efforts in bringing Serbia to come to terms with the reality of their
situation. Knowing that these diplomatic issues take time to resolve, he admitted
“patience was required by Austria” and assured Cartwright that “he would make
use of no sudden or violent action against Servia.”[131]
This statement can be viewed quite skeptically given the sentiment of Hötzendorf and the war party in Vienna.[132]
Following the diplomatic triumph achieved
through directly negotiating the Austro-Turkish settlement, Ährenthal was
emboldened to continue the course of action of dealing directly with Serbia.
While discussions progressed between Russia, France, and Britain concerning the
wording of the Serbian circular, all of which assumed a requirement for a
conference of the powers to ratify the changes to the Berlin Treaty, Austria
continuously dropped hints as to their intentions of dealing directly with
Serbia and Montenegro. Mensdorff correctly noted that Grey had tacitly agreed
to the route conducted by Austria in solving the Turkish issue of the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and due to this “[approved] modus procedendi, . . . negotiations
with regard to pending questions should in the first place be conducted between
the Powers directly interested.”[133]
Once the distractions
of the Austro-Turkish negotiations were over, Ährenthal dialed up the pressure on Serbia. Though publically
repeating his desires for a peaceful resolution to the impasse, he frequently
dropped hints as to the expiration of the commercial treaty governing tariffs
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, indicating an impending tariff war to start
in April.[134]
Austria’s ambassador at St.
Petersburg, Count Berchtold, also suggested an issuance of an ultimatum
to Serbia to a French newspaper around March 12.[135]
While Russia, France,
and Britain collaborated with Serbia in language of the note, Austria now tried
to influence the note by including her demands. Through Forgách, Ährenthal pushed to have Serbia
acknowledge the fait acompli of the
status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and assume a posture of good-intentions, thus implying
a reversal of the current course of events.[136]
This was communicated to the Serbians on March 6.
On March 10, the Serbian
ambassador Grouitch handed Grey the completed draft of the Serbian note. It read:
Considering that legally, after the proclamation of the
annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, the relations of Serbia with
Austria-Hungary has remained normal, Serbia has no desire to provoke a war with
the neighboring monarchy, nor wishes to change anything in it its legal relationship;
and wishes to continue to maintain, on the basis of reciprocity, her duties of
neighborliness with Austria-Hungary as in the past. Since the
Bosnia-Herzegovina question is a European issue, belonging to the signatory
powers of the Treaty of Berlin to fairly decide on the annexation and amendment
of Article 25 of the Treaty, Serbia, confident in the wisdom and fairness of
the powers, hands them as a competent tribunal, her cause without reservation, nor
asking Austria-Hungary for compensation whether territorial, political or economic.[137]
When Germany received this
Serbian note, which was intended to signify Serbia’s acceptance of the Bosnia
issue and ensure peaceful co-existence with Austria, Goschen, reported to Grey
that it had “not made a favorable impression.”[138]
Germany and Austria-Hungary took issue with what they described as the
ambiguous wording of the note and its provocative potential. Austria-Hungary
were upset that instead of recognizing the annexation in a legal way by
unilaterally ratifying the Austro-Turkish protocol, Serbia left the matter to
be decided by the powers at a conference.[139]
Schön particularly
derided the use of the word “Tribunal” in the description of a proposed meeting
between the powers to decide the legal points of the treaty. Schön and Austrian ambassador to
Germany, Szögyény both thought “that the allusion to a ‘Tribunal’ before which
Austria-Hungary was practically summoned to appear was most unfortunate and
likely to irritate both Baron Ährenthal
and Austrian public opinion.”[140]
Furthermore, they believed the omission of any reference to disarming was
deliberately evasive on the part of Serbia and signified a reluctance to abide
by the proposition to live alongside the Dual Monarchy in a peaceful manner.[141]
Kiderlen was particularly irate at this note, assuming Russian authorship of
the circular. He accused Britain, France, and Italy of being “responsible if
war occurred” because “if they had done their duty, [they] would have discouraged,
instead of encouraging, [Iswolsky] in his acts of bad faith.”[142]
The Kaiser penned “Absolute rubbish! This is Isvolsky’s dictation,” in the
margins.[143]
The Austrian reception
of the note was communicated more diplomatically to Ambassador Cartwright. Ährenthal considered the note “step
in the right direction” but had “no intention of replying to it” until Austria
received an official response to the Forgách communication to Serbia delivered
on March 6.[144]
This communication of March 6 informed Serbia that Austria-Hungary would open
direct negotiations with the kingdom on the commerce and tariffs issue provided
Serbia accept the issue of the annexation.[145]
The reply from Serbia arrived on March 14. An “insolent reply” according to a
foreign officer official, the Serbian note deferred to the language of the
circular issued to the powers on March 10 concerning the legal standing of the
Bosnia-Herzegovina issue and proceeded to discuss potential solutions to the
trade treaty expiration of March 31.[146]
The Austrians viewed this note similarly interpreting it to mean Serbia would
continue to live in a pacific manner with her neighbors, a view not shared by
the Austrians, rather than renouncing her military preparations, and “[criticizing]
in an offensive manner the action of the Austrian and Hungarian Gov[ernmen]ts
in regard to the commercial treaty.”[147]
Szögyény further commented on Austrian perceptions. He mentioned that Ährenthal saw the continued arming
being conducted by Serbia and Montenegro in contradiction to the note delivered
on the 10th. He also stated that unless Serbia delivered some
assurances by the evening of the 14th, Austria would follow through
with the deployment of 14 battalions into Bosnia-Herzegovina and the frontier
with Serbia.[148]
It was well understood that the Serbian reply to the Austrian demand would have
to meet the approval of the Austrian military party in order stop a military
action against Serbia.[149]
Impatient and
frustrated with what he considered the impertinence and intransigence of
Serbia, and by extension Russia, Ährenthal
resorted to a different form of coercion. Against the advice of Germany, on March
14, Ambassador Berchtold informed Isvolsky that Russia must immediately push
Serbia’s formal acceptance of the terms of the Turko-Austrian agreement in
regarding the legal status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, else Austria would make
public the notes from the Buchlau meeting.[150]
After the receipt of this, Nicolson noted Isvolsky was visibly shaken. Although
the compromised Russian foreign minister did not disclose the details of the
black-mail, Nicolson surmised that the “dread of a conflict between Austria and
Servia and the position in which Russia would be placed are weighing heavily on
[Isvolsky], and that he would leave no stone unturned to prevent hostilities if
possible.”[151]
This blackmail attempt
of Ährenthal left Isvolsky with
the realization that no more diplomatic song nor dance would extricate him from
the corner into which he had painted himself. The release of Ährenthal’s notes of the Buchlau
meeting would publically demonstrate Isvolsky’s willingness to sell out
pan-Slavism by his disdain for the Serbian cause. Neither he, nor the Russian
government could likely survive this embarrassment. The very day of the receipt
of Berchtold’s threat, a panicked Isvolsky dispatched Ambassador Osten-Sacken
to Bülow to plead with him to
find a way to defuse this disclosure. Bülow
said he would be happy to step in and assist, provided Isvolsky would restrain
Serbia.[152]
Bülow added another crucial stipulation ensuring Isvolsky agreed not to inform
Nicolson of the steps Germany would take.[153]
Pourtalés passed this
on to the Russian minister and said his discussions with Isvolsky concerning
these directions were very profitable. Isvolsky made certain Pourtalés
understood the severity of the domestic situation in which Russia found herself
and made sure the possibility of having a general conference to settle matters
further was not expressly prohibited in whatever language Germany chose to
attempt to settle the impasse. Pourtalés agreed to this and ensured Isvolsky
understood that the German intervention was not aimed at a “humiliation of
Russia, but rather to find a solution” to the present mess.[154]
So, while the Grey foreign office worked slowly, trying to massage the wording
of the Serbian note to satisfy Austria-Hungary, and while France worked equally
slowly with Austria-Hungary to try to restrain Serbia through Russia, Germany,
upon the request of Isvolsky, moved swiftly and decisively to put an end to the
impasse.
On March 17, Isvolsky
telegrammed Benckendorff, sharing with the British the tentative reply Russia
planned to give to Germany’s planned solution of solving the crisis and
recognizing the annexation with an exchange of notes.[155]
When the German proposal arrived at the British Foreign Office, Grey and his
colleagues were crestfallen. It appeared that their insistence for a European
Conference would fall by the wayside. Grey signaled his displeasure to Nicolson
at this development noting “the reply [was] obscure since it contain[ed] no
mention of a Conference to which reference [was] made in the earlier part of
the telegram.”[156]
Nicolson passed on this concern to Isvolsky, who quickly backtracked and added
a clause insisting that acceptance of the German proposal “did not replace the
necessity of a Conference.”[157]
Isvolsky made the
reply to Germany on March 17, incorporating language suggesting a conference.
It promised the “Russian government [would] on its part consider it a duty to
meet this procedure with the sincere wish to find in it the elements of a
solution which would be equally satisfying to all the signatory powers of the
Berlin Treaty.”[158]
It is evident by the
exchanges between Isvolsky and Nicolson, and between Isvolsky and Pourtalés, that Isvolsky clearly was keeping
Nicolson in the dark on significant aspects of the conversations between
Germany and Russia. Isvolsky continued to play the victim in his discourse with
the British Foreign Office, as well as publically. Isvolsky maintained the
charade of insisting upon a Conference when speaking with Nicolson, but took no
steps to demand it from Germany.[159]
Nicolson had a
decidedly anti-German bias and encouraged Isvolsky in a reckless path that Grey
was loathe to take. In a dispatch to Grey, Nicolson had a decidedly
protest-too-much moment in which he addressed this reputation he had of guiding
Isvolsky. In it, Nicolson attributed this perception to his “intimate”
knowledge of Isvolsky as well as the political circumstances in which he and
the other powers’ foreign ministers found themselves with Isvolsky.[160]
Nicolson was frequently cited by Pourtalés
as one who praised the “statesmanlike wisdom” of Isvolsky “the loudest” amongst
the foreign ambassadors at St. Petersburg.[161]
Isvolsky had tried to
placate her British friends by signaling an intent to fight for a conference but
the evidence suggests Isvolsky had no realistic hopes that a general conference
to discuss points tangential to that of the annexation and independence of
Bulgaria would be agreed to by Germany or Austria-Hungary. Britain further
found her position insisting on a Conference doomed when Paris signaled it
would meekly follow whichever path her ally Russia chose as best for her.
France did not wish to antagonize her continental neighbors unnecessarily and
informed Grey that if Russia no longer insisted upon a Conference, they would
not insist either.[162]
Grey was now isolated diplomatically.
The March 17 reply from
Russia was not received well in Berlin. Wilhelm himself made annotations throughout
the dispatch from Pourtalès accusing Isvolsky of prevaricating and lying.[164]
Therefore, on March 21, the infamous Kiderlen ultimatum was given to Isvolsky
by Count Pourtalès. Composed by Kiderlen-Wächter, Bülow’s deputy, It informed Isvolsky that Germany tired
of hearing tentative responses, and wished to know definitively if Russia
accepted the settlement the revocation of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty,
which granted administrative and occupation rights of Bosnia to
Austria-Hungary, by an exchange of notes. If Germany did not receive a yes or a
no, Kiderlen stated, “Wir würden uns dann
zurückziehen und den Dingen ihren Lauf lassen,” implying that Germany would
stand by if Austria started an armed intervention within Serbia and potentially
Russia.[165]
Thus Isvolsky received
what he wished for at the beginning, an escape from the corner in which he had
painted himself. The ultimatum and the geopolitical situation of Russia amongst
the Great Powers presented no other alternative than to accept the Kiderlen
ultimatum, allowing Isvolsky to end the crisis and portray himself as the
victim. Isvolsky did a masterful job in manipulating Nicolson, a noted
Russophile, in presenting the scenario of a powerful Germany acting in perfect
coordination with an ambitious and unscrupulous Austria-Hungary to jump upon
the opportunities presented by the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Russia’s
capitulation however, was savaged within the pan-Slavic press. The Novoe Vremya alleged Isvolsky’s
surrender to be the cause of “the eclipse of Russian influence in the Balkans
for the next century.”[166]
Following the Russian
capitulation, the Russian government compelled Serbia to adopt extraordinary
conciliatory language in accepting Austria’s annexation. This time, the terms
were written by the Austrian government. They stated Serbia recognizes that her
rights were not violated by the annexation, that she would cease her
protestations that had been taking place since October, that she would change
her course and conduct herself as a good neighbor to Austria, and that she
would de-mobilize her army, and disband her volunteer militias.[167]
This text was accepted by Serbia on March 28.[168]
With the Russian
acceptance of the Kiderlen ultimatum and the pacification of Serbia now
secured, Austria-Hungary moved to pressure Britain and France to endorse the
abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Ährenthal threatened coercion upon Britain. He stated that should
Serbia not follow through with the terms of the note and were forced to use
arms upon Serbia, and should Britain leave the question of the annexation open,
Austria-Hungary would then be compelled to “delay and complicate payment of
indemnity to Turkey.”[169]
In Paris, Prime Minister Cambon received similar dispatches.
On April 19, 1909,
Great Britain accepted the alteration of the Treaty of Berlin via diplomatic
note, thus formally accepting the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by
Austria-Hungary. The crisis was over.[170]
Chapter 3 – The Immediate Political Postmortem
Mercer rightly contends Russia knew the inevitability of the annexation
and essentially sought to get “something for nothing” whilst “exploit[ing]
anti-Austrian feelings in the Balkans and capitaliz[ing] on Europe’s dismay
over the violation of the Berlin treaty.”[171] This strategy of course,
hinged on keeping the negotiations at Buchlau secret. Ährenthal, though, was
forced by the events occurring in Turkey and Bulgaria to force the issue
quicker than the Russians expected. When Isvolsky expressed buyer’s remorse,
the threat of releasing the Ährenthal account of the conference at Buchlau
quieted the official Russian stance, forcing her to internalize its grievances.
Throughout the affair, Isvolsky comes across
as relatively ignorant, unprepared, and inadequately matched in comparison to
Ährenthal. While Ährenthal understood the political as well as military
concerns of his government, in dealing with the issue of the Sandžak for
example, Isvolsky showed remarkable ignorance in the state of affairs of the
Russian military following the disasters in the east. Just two years following
the defeat, Isvolsky had “suggested that joint Anglo-Russian military action in
Turkey” could have very beneficial consequences for Russian interest in the
region.[172] This
suggestion was of course made during the period in which all military attachés
regularly reported to their governments of the inability of Russia to wage any
offensive war. This is in addition to the political realities of
post-Revolutionary Russia in which the people had little stomach for more
foreign adventures in pursuit of the glory of Imperial Russia.
Isvolsky realized Russia’s impotence and had
vastly underestimated the outrage generated by Serbia. She had unwittingly
uncovered a seething hot-bed of nationalism in her own sphere of influence that
threatened to undermine the partnership, albeit uneasy, it had enjoyed with
Austria-Hungary for many years. “In the face of these elemental forces the
diplomatic devices of a tiny decision-making elite that had contained
Austro-Russian differences … for the past century were swept away.”[173]
At the end of the affair, the Russians found
themselves out-maneuvered on all fronts. Her alliance with France was
established primarily as a mutual defense against Teutonic aggression, not as a
club with which to back up Slavic interests in the Balkans. Despite the
underhanded nature of Ährenthal’s diplomacy, France would never come to
Russia’s aid militarily solely to avenge offenses done to Serbia. Britain was only
in the beginning stages of friendly relations with Russia having sparred with
the bear for many years over the Middle East. Neither Grey, nor Clemenceau
would back up Russia with military might over this minor regional issue. Grey’s
tactics were doomed from the start because he was beholden to an amateur
foreign-policy maker with a losing hand.
As has been shown, Serbia was outraged and
pushed what most expected to be a minor bump in international relations up to
the point of armed conflict between herself and Austria-Hungary. That the Great
Powers underestimated the terrific response from Belgrade is understandable
given that Russia had already in a conspiratorial manner handed over the
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy in 1877 as
compensation for remaining neutral in a Russo-Turkish war.[174] The fact that the Serbs
flew into an uproar when the provinces were officially handed over speaks
volumes to the passion of the flame of Slavic nationalism that had erupted in
the intervening thirty years.
Throughout February
and March of 1909, Isvolsky repeatedly made errors in diplomacy and allowed his
personal and emotional state cloud his judgment and actions. He frequently
resorted to threats to burn bridges with the British and the French. As already
seen, Isvolsky interpreted Hardinge’s cordial meeting with Bülow as an abandonment of the
Anglo-Russo Entente.[175]
He also accused Pichon of selling out Russia in Pichon’s negotiations with Bülow’s subordinate Kiderlin.[176]
He interpreted normal, cordial diplomatic dialogue between Britain and France
with Germany and Austria as signals that the understandings between Russia’s
newfound friends were collapsing. Ambassador Nelidov felt it necessary to
correct Isvolsky’s interpretation of the Kiderlen proposal calling it a
“misunderstanding.”[177]
His actions were consistently taken out of a fear of diplomatic isolation. He
knew he had overextended himself at the risk of political compromise to the
pan-Slav movement at home. He was eviscerated in the press for his advising the
Serbians to capitulate to Austrian demands.[178]
Isvolsky made promises he could not keep to the Serbians, and when asked what
concessions he believed Serbia could gain through negotiations with Serbia, he
pleaded ignorance.[179]
He assured Milovanovitch that “we, on our part, can only repeat that the act of
annexation will in the last resort not receive our signature, knowing full well
his inability to keep this promise.”[180]
Isvolsky’s successor,
Sergei Sazonov, who had previously served as the Tsar’s ambassador to the
Vatican, described Isvolsky’s singular character flaw as taking everything far
too personally, and concerning the disagreeable dealings with Ährenthal,
“attributed everything . . . to evil intentions and a desire to be unjust to him.”[181]
Grey was at fault too
as he frequently prevaricated and neglected to send clear signals to his
counterparts in Europe. To wit, in a March 16 cable to Isvolsky, Nelidov passed
on the British Foreign Ministry’s assurances that they would “take part in
exerting . . . pressure and at all events will support by every possible means every Russian initiative at Belgrade”
(emphasis added).[182]
Yet in the next sentence, Benckendorff acknowledges Grey’s hedge in that he “believes
that this answer must confine itself to assurances of readiness for peace, to
the desire for friendly and neighbourly relations, and to the willingness to
discuss, by means of direct negotiations, all questions of a purely economic
nature affecting the interests of both States.”[183]
Though Grey frequently assured Russia that it would do its utmost to pressure
Serbia into pacifing Austrian concerns, the next moment Grey would limit the
extent of this assurance. This did not help in aiding Isvolsky’s confidence in
the ability of Grey to support Russia during the crisis and is testament to
Isvolsky’s turning to Bülow for
a more decisive mediation. The sentiment in Russia during the crisis was one of
dismay; The Entente with France and with England was utterly worthless in
contrast to the unwavering support Germany gave to her ally Austria-Hungary.[184]
While Germany acted
swiftly and decisively, Grey did not. The five weeks from the time the British
government decided to intervene until the Kiderlen ultimatum to Russia were marked
by constant indecision and prevarication. If Grey’s motivation was simply to
forestall war, he succeeded, but he did in no wise provide leadership or a
clear road to a peaceful understanding between the parties. He was the
anti-Bismarck. Grey tried to play the game of delicate balance, but in doing
so, he sacrificed clarity in expressing goals and priorities, especially to his
allies. In contrast, from the outset, the British legation clearly understood
where Germany stood on the matter. At almost every encounter between Count
Metternich and Grey, Metternich reiterated the full support of Germany for her
ally Austria in the matter.[185]
And though Bülow and von Schön continuously reiterated
their desire for a peaceful outcome, they made it quite clear their ultimate
decisions would be subject to supporting the dual Monarchy.[186]
Prior to the Kiderlen
ultimatum, Grey had practically resorted to pleading to Isvolsky, repeatedly
reminding him of the impossibility of obtaining the concessions really sought
after by the pan-Slav Serb nationalists: the independence of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and territorial concessions by Austria.[187]
Grey reminded him that these would be unobtainable except by force of arms and
British support would be limited to being diplomatic in nature; any venture
into war would not find British aid.[188]
Cooper believes a
primary reason for the intervention had to do with Britain’s standing in the
Near Eastern countries. “If Britain observed neutrality 'we should lose our
position in the Near East, and also amongst the Mahometan [sic] communities in
Egypt, India and elsewhere.”[189]
If this is the case, then it begs the question as to why did Grey not already
intervene during the height of the Austro-Turkish tensions immediately
following the announcement of the annexation in October of 1908? If the
maintenance of the reputation of British diplomacy was the preeminent factor in
the Foreign Office’s calculus, Grey’s indecisive approach to “leading” the
mediation effort was a curious one indeed.
Grey’s foreign policy
was impotent in that there was a distinct incongruity between the British
Foreign Office and the court at St. Petersburg. While Isvolsky and Bülow conferred on the nature of the
assistance the Germans would render to extricate Isvolsky from his precarious
position of being beholden to the Slavic nationalists, Grey and the Foreign
Office worried aloud whether the proud Isvolsky would be able politically to
swallow the proposed exchange of notes as proffered by Bülow.[190]
The primary reason the
British effort did not work was simply that all the other actors had far more
to lose than did Britain. Isvolsky had compromised himself, gambling with chips
he did not have. His personal fall and humiliation was negligible, however,
next to the prospect of a nationalistic, still-revolutionary public discovering
his duplicitousness. Russia could not risk a war over a diplomatic error of her
making. Germany knew she held the high cards at all times and only shrewdly
played them at an opportune time and at the request of her opponent. France
could not and would not risk a war over matters completely tangential to her
interests. Austria-Hungary knew she had the full backing of Wilhelmine Germany
and stretched her trust to the limit. Britain had very little to gain in the affair.
Grey was too timid to bluff unconditional support to Russia and this meekness
was reflected in the manner in which she conducted the mediation effort in
early 1909.Had Grey or Pichon, from the outset, made clear their firm support
behind Russia and the necessity for a conference, whether Isvolsky felt the
need to request a firmer restraining of Austria from Germany, and whether Kiderlen
then issues the ultimatum is at least subject to a healthy dose of skepticism.
Chapter 4 – The Reasons behind the British Mediation Effort
The reasons why Grey chose this
particular time frame in which to intervene are two-fold, and somewhat
intertwined. First, he truly did fear the outbreak of a regional conflict that
could morph into a general European war. Second, he wished to maintain the
Entente with Russia. Backing down to German pressure would risk fracturing the
new understanding.
The British Fear of a War and its Consequences
Following the Young Turk revolution, British hopes
soared for the prospects of improved administration and even closer ties
between the Britain and the Porte. A regional war would fling the holdings of the
once-mighty Ottoman Empire into abject chaos, with either Austria-Hungary or
Russia filling the power vacuum. Strategically, and from a Mediterranean naval
perspective, as will be discussed later, Britain did not have very much to lose
should her influence wane in Istanbul. However the economic consequences of
disruptions of the Baghdad railway project due to a war, let alone the
potential unraveling of the progress made with Anglo-Russian understandings in
the Subcontinent made the prospect of a regional war untenable to Grey. “I
urged that it was not merely a question between Austria and Servia alone, but a
question of preserving the peace of Europe,” is what Grey wrote Nicolson at the
start of the British efforts to mediate the crisis.[191]
It is clear that Nicolson believed Russia would intervene
militarily should Austria invade Serbia regardless of whether the Dual Monarchy
was provoked or not. The only thing that could hold Russia back from this
eventuality, Nicolson explained, is the fear of a German response and the
possibility that France would refuse to come to Russia’s aid over a Balkan
matter.[192]
Thus far, Russia had no information to suggest Germany would sit on its hands
and judging by how Nicolson read Isvolsky’s interpretations of Nelidov’s
dispatches from Paris, Russia was terrified that France would sit out as well.[193]
The Desire to Maintain the Entente
Grey and Nicolson both
knew how precarious the Russian situation was. The democratic reforms granted
in the 1905 revolution introduced an unpredictability to affairs in general in
the Russian government. Isvolsky was a product of this increasing
liberalization of Russia’s government. He had “advocated a rapproachment with
England,” and had “the support of most progressive Russian diplomats and
political leaders.”[194]
Isvolsky had no aspirations for a pan-Slavic state as evidenced by his
willingness to barter with Austria-Hungary. While Isvolsky had nothing
personally invested with the pan-Slavic movement, the nascent political groups
and newspapers in St. Petersburg did. He further knew he had made an
extraordinary gamble in attempting to open the Straights, and with his neck on the
line from his fumbled diplomacy with Ährenthal
in the summer and fall of the previous year, was in danger of bringing down the
government should Serbia’s clamoring for recompense not meet satisfaction.[195]
The Russian pan-Slavic
press viciously attacked Isvolsky regularly throughout the five weeks prior to
the capitulation prompted by the receipt of the Kiderlen ultimatum. The press
saw Isvolsky as having dictated the terms directly from the Austrian government
upon Serbia and had “sacrifice[d] the prestige of Russia.”[196]
Hardinge himself had
already previously witnessed the precarious Russian politics during and after
the disastrous 1905 Russo-Japanese war.[197]
Pyotr Stolypin, the Russian Prime Minister, who according to the assistant
Foreign Minister Charykov, was the “last and only hope of avoiding for Russia
the cataclysm of a revolution,” knew very well the imminent political danger
should Russia suffer such a diplomatic defeat in a showdown between the German
world and Slav-dom.[198]
He made it clear to Nicolson on the February 16, that should Austria move
militarily on Serbia, the political climate within Russia necessitated a
military response.[199]
The Foreign Office was
indeed concerned over the prospects of a revolution breaking out should the
Russian government be seen as having forsaken the Slavs to the Austro-Hungarian
advance in the Balkans. However, Nicolson prevaricated on this assessment as
well, stating privately to Grey that he feared if Russia did go to war in
defense of Serbia, that the state of Russian finances could precipitate a
revolution as well.[200]
Thus, Britain was
confronted with a dilemma that should events take their course, a war, the
limits of which could not be adequately predicted, and a revolution would likely
take place. Grey hoped that by inserting Britain in an active role in
mediating, this equation could have a peaceful result.
If the prospect of an overthrow of the Russian
government was not impetus enough, Britain also confronted the prospect of the
collapse of the Entente should Russia capitulate to the German ultimatum.
Britain already suspected the Kaiser’s bizarre stunt at Tangiers was spurred
more by a desire to break up the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 than to secure
German commercial interests in Morocco.[201]
It was no stretch of the imagination to connect the annexation crisis to
insidious Germanic plots to blow up the Anglo-Russian Entente three years
later.
Grey’s diplomatic
tactics during the mediation were guided not by a desire to aid Serbia, nor
necessarily by a desire to avoid war, but by a fear of losing the Entente with
Russia. Grey feared that by ceding to the Austrian desires to deal unilaterally
with Serbia, Britain would be abandoning Serbia to face Austria alone, a fact
Isvolsky made clear to Nicolson.[202]
Grey knew the ramifications of this in an unstable Russia with a foreign
minister who had seemingly already sold a brother Slavic state down the river.
Chapter 5 – The Foreign Policy Aims of the Powers
To fully appreciate the
annexation crisis, it is crucial to understand the foreign policy aims of the
nations involved. The personalities in the foreign offices and the policies
they developed determined the direction of the discourse throughout the crisis.
Britain
To be clear at the
outset, British foreign policy had long been chiefly devoted to the expansion
and protection of its maritime trade and the security of its far-flung colonial
holdings. As such, British naval superiority was the dominant priority of
policy-makers.[203]
Despite the slow, but steady advance of liberalism and increased
democratization within the British government, the realm of foreign policy had
generally been the domain of the professional nobility and marked by
predictability and continuity. The dramatic shifts in balance of power in the
latter half of the Nineteenth Century only served to increase the power of the
Cabinet.[204]
The years of 1895 to
1905 in which the Liberals were out of power had seen shifts in British policy
concerning relations with Germany, France, and Russia. Britain had actively
moved to check Russian activities through the Anglo-Japanese alliance, had
passively countered French colonial ambitions through natural overlap of
interests, and had reacted to a perception of German expansionism that
threatened Britain’s maritime dominance.[205]
As already seen, the sudden rise in German power on the continent, Wilhelm’s
ambition with the dismissal of Bismarck, and the Tirpitz naval program
convinced Britain that her splendid isolation was coming to a close.
In December 1905, in
the midst of the Morocco crisis, the Unionist Balfour government suddenly
resigned ushering in a new Labor government. Viscount Sir Edward Grey, who had
previously cut his teeth in the Foreign Office of the final Gladstone
government from 1892 to 1895, was asked by the new Prime Minister Henry
Campbell-Bannerman to take leadership within the Foreign Office.[206]
Grey remarks in his memoirs of the importance of continuity within the office.
“Mr. Gladstone’s Government continued the policy of Lord Salisbury as they
found it; when Lord Salisbury returned to the Foreign Office in 1895 he saw no
more reason to change that policy than Lord Rosebury or Lord Kimberley had
done; he continued it.”[207]
Grey’s aim was to continue this practice, in the belief that foreign policy lay
“beyond the realm of party political exchanges” and the amplitude of foreign
policy swings precipitated by parties would have disastrous effects on the
prestige efficacy of British efforts in foreign affairs.[208]
Because Britain’s
foreign policy revolved around maritime trade and protective naval capacity, Grey
sympathized with and understood Isvolsky’s aim concerning the Straights of the
Dardanelles: access to a warm-water port. While many nations had their own
ports, “Russia, with the most extensive territory and a huge population, had no
outlet under her own control. . . . Was it possible ever to have peace and
quiet, or indeed to have anything but recurrent friction with Russia on such
terms?”[209]
With the Suez and
Gibraltar secure, the oft-cited Defense Committee Paper of 1903 that assured
the government the strategic balance of power would remain intact should
Russian warships be granted the ability to freely transit the Dardanelles,
provided Grey room to maneuver in the diplomatic arena in furthering its
Entente with Russia.[210]
Grey’s only concern remained the preservation of the Congress of Europe and
mutual consent to any treaty modifications.
One of Britain’s purposes
for pursuing the Entente with Russia was to hedge against a falling out with
the Ottoman Empire. Following the Young Turk Revolution, Britain suddenly found
herself loosely allied with both Russia and Turkey, countries with vastly
differing interests. The British effort at mediating the annexation crisis
cannot be viewed separately from the desire to restore good relations with the
reforming Turkish government. Frequently during the crisis, footnotes at the
bottom of dispatches penned by Lord Mallet, Hardinge, and Grey referred to how
it would affect relations with the Turks.[211]
The British press latched onto the relationship with Turkey from the outset of
the crisis following the October announcement of the annexation.[212]
Frequently as well, the issue of Montenegro arose during the crisis.[213]
Prior to the Young Turk Revolution, one of Britain’s goals had been to work
jointly with Russia to press reforms on the Ottoman Empire on the Christian
minorities in her holdings, particularly in Montenegro.
Germany
Germany’s foreign policy was one
of imperial ambition and only tempered by an unwavering support for her primary
ally, Austria-Hungary. The Dual Alliance founded in 1879 remained the bedrock
of German foreign policy. Bülow
explained his foreign policy to the Reichstag in 1899 in these terms:
The rapid growth of our population, the unprecedented
expansion of our industry, the industriousness of our merchants, in short, the
phenomenal vitality of the German people have integrated us into the world
economy and drawn us into international politics. If the British speak of
Greater Britain, if the French speak of Nouvelle France, if the Russians move
into Asia, we too have the right to a Greater Germany.[214]
To further this goal, Germany expanded her
commercial interests in Ottoman Turkey, at the same moment Britain began to
disengage due to the concerns of Ottoman repression. Germany negotiated with
Turkey to construct a railway meant to connect the Persian Gulf to Berlin, to
allow overland transport of colonial commerce from German colonies in Africa.
This Baghdad railway was secured with the assistance of hefty bank loans to the
cash-strapped Ottoman Empire in the early 1900s.[215]
Germany also expanded her colonial holdings in Africa into “Damaraland
[modern-day Namibia), Cameroon, Togoland, [and] German East Africa [modern day
Tanzania]” as well as places in the Pacific.[216]
The furtherance of the Wilhelmine strategy of positioning Germany into her
rightful place in the sun alongside the other imperial powers of France and
Britain inevitably collided with the interests of these colonial powers, most
notably Britain.
During the annexation crisis, Germany’s ultimate
desire was to forestall war while supporting her ally. Secondarily to that,
Germany did not wish to allow Vienna to recklessly pursue her own course
without equal input from Germany. A regional war could have disastrous
consequences for her as well. Kiderlen stated to Goschen, “We certainly do not
want war—as Russia would be sure to get a beating and that would mean a revolution
followed by a republic. That would not suit our book at all. Especially as we
are not ready for one ourselves yet.”[217]
The two guiding
principles of avoiding war and reclaiming the initiative from Austria led to
the aggressive and decisive manner with which Germany dealt with the impasse
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Kiderlen’s frustration with the seemingly
inevitable slouch toward war led him to mention the possibility of disclosing Ährenthal’s notes concerning Buchlau
to the public, but he advised Szögyény to hold on to it for a little more time,
advise that we have seen went unheeded when Berchtold presented this coercive
possibility to Isvolsky.[218]
The Kiderlen ultimatum
was delivered to accomplish these principles. Germany believed Austria would
fully exploit Russia’s military and political weakness in order to deal with
the pan-Slavic threat to her borders found in Serbia. To forestall this
Kiderlen determined to call out Isvolsky publically, not to humiliate Russia,
but to forestall a regional war that would prove Russian impotence rather than
merely suggest it.
Germany was well aware
of Isvolsky’s compromising position and that his own government was unwilling
to back him. Pourtalès reported on the subsiding of the pan-Slavic clamor in the
Duma.[219]
Reporting on a Duma meeting, the German naval attaché Captain von Hintze noted:
I would like to underline the importance of the Duma meeting
on 8 March. For the time being, Russia has broken off her policy of bluffing
concerning a war and expressed hope for the future. I do not fear a relapse
into that policy; it is final. As for the future, the War Minister has said the
creation of an army for 1908 requirements will take fifteen years. Today, three
years after the war [with Japan], neither the army nor the fleet is ready for
war. No material has been procured, due to lack of funding. . . . My friends’
assessment of a three to five year recovery from the defeat seems to me to be
premature.[220]
Assured both from the request
initiated by Isvolsky to mediate, and by this confirmation of the nature of
Russia’s impotence, Germany decisively acted.
Russia
The foreign policy of
Russia during this crisis is difficult to pin down. As we have already seen,
Isvolsky’s program was disjointed and conflicted with internal Russian policy.
The state of affairs in Russia was not compatible with dealing aggressively
with Austria-Hungary and her benefactor Germany. The domestic and military
functions of her government focused on achieving internal stability and restoring
her military preparedness while Isvolsky embarked on a campaign to restore the
prestige of the Russian protector of Orthodoxy.
Throughout the
Bismarckian period, Russia’s friendly relations with Germany allowed her to
focus on her far eastern affairs which would end up embroiling her in the
disastrous war with Japan in 1905. The subsequent revolution and Isvolsky’s
appointment as foreign minister marked a return to looking toward the west, in
particular with an eye to the states under Ottoman rule.[221]
This tact back to affairs on her western border coincided with the
deteriorating and polarization of the Great Powers in the post-Bismarck
realignment. Isolated diplomatically, Russia felt forced to find an ally in
France, and later in England.[222]
In the year following
his appointment, Isvolsky developed a reputation of accomplishment in fostering
peaceful relations, even in Vienna. Viennese papers heralded his securing of
the Russo-Anglo Entente and restored relationship with Japan.[223]
These successes notwithstanding, it remains highly puzzling as to why Isvolsky
chose 1908 as a time to pursue an aggressive course of action in foreign
affairs. Isvolsky’s successor Sazonov, described Russia’s condition in dark,
somber tones. His picture of a Russia still militarily impotent from the
defeats in Manchuria and politically unstable, still battling revolutionary
fervor is seemingly incompatible with a nation able to pursue perhaps the
single-most sought after foreign policy concession of the Russian Empire.[224]
Austria
Ährenthal’s goals were quite
simple. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, he wished to end the dream of a
pan-Slavic arising from its ashes on his southern and eastern borders. With
Austria-Hungary already containing a very large portion of Slavic peoples under
her dominion, an expansionist, nationalist state on her flanks was untenable.
The process of nation building on our southeastern border has
naturally been fluid recently through the weakening of Turkey. Because of this,
we have had to take a position 30 years ago [through the occupation granted
under the Berlin Treaty] and now by the annexation. These two acts mean the
destruction of the dream of a greater Serbian state between the Danube, the
Sava, and the Adriatic Sea.[225]
Ährenthal’s secondary goal was
to divorce Austria’s dependence upon Germany in the conduct of her foreign
affairs.[226]
Ährenthal saw direct negotiations between Austria and the parties directly
affected as the path to these two ends. This method he viewed as his
prerogative, and conducted the preliminary negotiations bilaterally between
Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Following dealing with Turkey, he wished to then
directly deal with Serbia. Once the terms had been ironed out, the issue of the
changes to the Treaty of Berlin would be submitted to the powers for
consideration with all of the contentious matters taken care of. Because Ährenthal
believed he had already achieved an understanding with Russia, Serbia’s primary
benefactor, the annexation issue was only an obstacle to Turkey and therefore
tangentially to Britain. Ährenthal believed the annexation should not meet any
realistic resistance from Serbia as she was not “directly interested,” not
being a signatory power to the Treaty of Berlin.[227]
Once Ährenthal negotiated the terms of the agreement with Turkey concerning
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, he would then move on to dealing likewise with
Serbia as he insinuated to Cartwright in February 1909.[228]
France
France was entirely
motivated by a need for security. The fall of Bismarck, who had successfully
managed to isolate France diplomatically for twenty years proved to be a
turning point for French foreign policy. The cancelling of the reinsurance
treaty between Germany and Russia provided an opportunity for France to woo
Russia. Russia signed an official treaty with France on January 4, 1894 albeit
begrudgingly, as the totalitarian Tsarist government was loath to ally herself
with a republican one.[229]
This treaty was more than the political ententes that Britain reached with
France and Russia later, and became a primary concern for the Triple Alliance.
The terms of the treaty compelled France or Russia to support the other with
force of arms in case of an attack upon the one.[230]
This treaty was entirely defensive in nature and was not enforceable if the
actions of one of the parties were aggressive in nature. The goal of both
France and Russia was to “end their isolation.”[231]
At the start of the
crisis as at the end, France’s motivation was to maintain the peace and avoid
general war. Even more motivated than Britain by her neighborly proximity to
Germany, France engaged more aggressively with Russia in attempting to talk
down Isvolsky’s backing of Serbia. France did not wish to go to war over an
issue of Slavic nationalism in the Balkans. In October, following the
disclosure of Austria-Hungary’s intentions, Clemenceau had not been opposed to
the idea of the annexation and seemed contented to the ultimate end, rather he,
like Grey, felt it compulsory to oppose the manner in which Austria-Hungary breached
the treaty of Berlin.[232]
France’s protestations grew more muted as the rhetoric intensified and
war-tensioned escalated. She shifted from a pro-forma opposition into one
almost speaking for Germany, expressing the necessity of Russia to reign in
Serbia:
The Russian Government will surely agree with the French
Government that both must do everything possible to prevent the danger of an
armed conflict in a question in which the vital interests of Russia are not
involved. French public opinion would be unable to comprehend that such a
question could lead to a war in which the French and the Russian army would
have to participate.[233]
Chapter 5 – The Reaction in the British Press
Alongside the explosion
of general prosperity and power Britain enjoyed, the nineteenth century saw
equally dramatic movements in Christian charity and the missionary spirit. The
abuses of the Ottoman government upon Christian minorities in the Balkans were
issues that remained a constant thorn in the flesh of a Foreign Office whose
goal in that region was the support of the Porte as a protector against Russian
incursion into the Mediterranean and as an enabler of the securing of Egypt and
the Suez. This “humanitarian feeling in Britain and the persisting sympathy for
Christian populations under Turkish rule was so strong that British political
and material interests were overborne by it.”[234]
This was a delicate balancing act in that much of Britain’s colonial holdings
were of Muslim populations. Britain had worked diligently to establish herself
as an imperial protector of Muslim peoples. She faced a crossroads with the
realities reported in the press concerning Ottoman repressions both in the
Balkans and in Christian Armenia. At the time of the annexation crisis, the
Young Turk revolution and the Entente with Russia were still in their infancy.
Grey’s statements
aside, there is not much evidence that the press had any significant impact
upon policymaking. Robbins attests to Grey and his predecessors using the
concept of the public opinion in defending their policies in speeches and
statements to the public and Parliament, but aside from these claims, no clear
evidence exists to support the idea that the public at large held power to sway
opinion or change course in foreign affairs.[235]
The reason for this, Robbins proposes, is that the study of foreign affairs was
also in its infancy and it’s “opinion-makers . . . restricted to the editors
and journalists of the daily and weekly press, writers on public affairs
generally, and specialists in the history of one or other country.”[236]
Robbins assessment is
supported by the way the press covered the events of 1908 through 1909. The
London papers reacted to unfolding events with much moderation and care . . .
for the large part reflecting the tone of the Grey Foreign Office. In October,
newspaper articles reporting on the annexation largely echoed the official
sentiments of the British government. It recognized the slight done to Turkey,
the need for Britain to protect the Porte’s interests, and the inviolability of
international treaties.[237]
There was not a great outcry in the London press as much as a calm, measured
reporting of events. The Times did report how foreign media reacted to it,
particularly focusing on the dramatic outcry in Serbia and the calls for war
therein.[238]
As the crisis
deepened, the coverage grew more concerned. The tone was decidedly
anti-Austrian with one correspondent commenting on the “apparent blindness” of Ährenthal concerning his assumed
ignorance of the ramifications of his aggressive policy.[239]
The foreign correspondents regularly updated their readers with dispatches
conveying both the general mood in their various foreign capitals as well as
relaying official releases by the various governments.
In February, the tone
began to change to one of pessimistic despair. On the February 23, the Times
Vienna correspondent remarked that the general feeling in Austrian circles was
“war [was] but a question of weeks, perhaps even days.”[240]
On the same page, the Berlin correspondent reported on efforts the German
government made to defend its decision to not participate in Grey’s proposed
approach of Vienna. Germany had made a statement in the Cologne Gazette explaining as such.[241]
Following the Kiderlen
ultimatum, the overwhelming response of the British press was one of general
relief that a war had not broken out.[242]
This relief was augmented by some post-facto analysis of the diplomacy leading
up to the exchange of notes. It was accepted that Germany had acted very
shrewdly and consistently applied a policy of attempting to separate Russia
from France and Britain.[243]
The news of the
Russian acceptance of the German proposal drew varied and conflicting reports
in the British and foreign press. The Times of London reported the method of
the German proposal was a personal letter from Wilhelm to the Tsar in which he
urged Nicolas to accept an Austrian proposal to abrogate Article 25 of the
Treaty of Berlin; and that this was done primarily to throw all support behind
Austria-Hungary in order to repair a strained relationship with the heir to the
Hapsburg throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand.[244]
This claim was later retracted just the next day.[245]
Rumors were not confined to this however; a story was also printed declaring
Isvolsky had resigned due to the affair.[246]
The Times also
speculated that Germany’s intervention was primarily influential due to its
shifting military posture against Russia. The paper reported that the German
army had made pre-mobilization preparations while many Austrian troops moved
from an eastward orientation, to one prepared to strike southward in the
direction of Serbia.[247]
In England, public
perceptions of the crisis were molded against Germany by portraying the end of
the crisis as forcing Russia into surrendering. Bülow’s praising the acceptance of Russia of the Kiderlin note was
viewed in the most negative light possible.
[Bülow’s]
effusive compliment to the Tsar for his services to the cause of peace
furnishes a cynical documentary on the circumstances in which they were
rendered. The striking parallel between this Serbian crisis and the Morocco
difficulty does not escape attention. The reports of M. Isvolsky’s resignation,
emenating from pro-German circles, show that, just as in the case of M.
Delecassé, one of Germany’s
objects was the downfall of the Minister who ventured to conclude an
understanding with England.[248]
This perception of German bullying was no doubt
influenced by the Russian press who took a similar view. The Novoe Vremya
excoriated the Russian government for “[forgetting] even the existence of the
Triple Entente and took the decisive
step without consulting or even informing England and France.”[249]
The press dutifully reported the best outcome for which Isvolsky could hope.
Rather than see the downfall of the entire government and possible revolution
for the exposure of his reckless and ill-informed foreign policy, he became the
scapegoat for the affair.
Overall, the press
largely acted as an official purveyor of information for affected governments.
The correspondents in the various capitals were dependent upon official
interviews with press officers of the courts and their dispatches reflected
remarkable similarity with the diplomatic cables surveyed in this study.[250]
The writers also relied on foreign newspaper articles on subjects to which the
authors did not have first-hand sources. These articles were provided in gist
for their domestic audiences in Britain. In the London Times, there was little
room for editorial commentary for reasons previously explained.
Chapter 6 – Concluding Thoughts
“There is nothing more
futile than a momentary diplomatic score off a Foreign Minister or his country.
It is worse than futile; it has later on to be paid for, and it wrecks that
confidence which is as essential in permanent relations between Governments as
it is between great commercial houses.”[251]
Thus spoke Grey upon reflection in his memoirs on the crisis.
Isvolsky and Ährenthal did not set out to
destroy a working partnership with each other. They were not intent on building
an alliance. They did not wish to poison their relations to the extent that it
did six months following the annexation announcement. Both of the foreign ministers
believed the peoples being bartered in private talks would simply go along with
whatever outcome the powerful elites determined for them. They vastly
underestimated the reactions their decisions would make in Bulgaria, Serbia,
Montenegro, and elsewhere. Traditionally, Austria-Hungary gets the majority of
the blame for causing the crisis. Certainly, Ährenthal was evasive and
duplicitous in his dealings with Russia, but how can he be blamed for accepting
a diplomatic gift from an incoherent and incompetent Russian government? Now
whether Austria-Hungary should get the blame for setting the ripe conditions
for the Great War to take place six years later is another matter.
Russia, of course had fumbled the entire
exchange. Nicholas II claimed to have not given permission to Isvolsky to
barter away Bosnia-Herzegovina no matter what the price, though Isvolsky’s
assistant denies this, stating the Tsar had approved a memorandum detailing the
plan prior to Isvolsky’s approach to Ährenthal.[252] When Francis Joseph announced
the annexation, Nicholas II decried it, leaving Isvolsky out on his own. How
this occurred exactly is unknown. Schmitt speculates it could be attributed to
the Tsar’s propensity to go along with whatever the latest aid or advisor said.[253] Whatever happened,
Isvolsky was abandoned by his government and left to attempt to force a
European Conference to which Austria-Hungary could be brought to heel by
France, Britain, and Russia. This, of course, the second Algeciras, never
happened and Russia was left smarting to restore her credibility both amongst
the Great Powers from a military standpoint, and to the Slavs in the Balkans
who rightly wondered if they had been sold down the river by their benefactor. “The
Russians themselves were determined at all costs that the humiliation of 1909
must never be repeated.”[254]
While it is clear that the crisis of the
annexation did not result in general war, it is an interesting proposal to
consider what could have happened had Russia’s military not been so incapable
or politics so unsteady. Would Nicholas II have moved upon Austria Hungary
because of this offense? It is unlikely given the risk versus reward
considerations for such a seemingly minor offense. However, given Nicholas’s
ineptitude and instability it is worthy of consideration. However, it is more
likely that Ährenthal, astute as he was, would not have so brazenly affronted
Russia had Russia possessed the capacity to defend Slavic interests with
military might. Equally, it is likely the Germany would have restrained
Austria-Hungary in the face of an offended Russia.
Despite the perception of bowing to Slavic
interests, during the crisis, Russia was not so much concerned about the nation
of Serbia or some of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans, but was mortified by
the prospect of losing her status as one of the Great Powers. “Neither [Isvolsky
nor Charykov] showed any of the simple-minded and thoroughly sincere solicitude
for the little Slav brothers which is so characteristic of [Prime Minister
Stolypin].”[255]
The threat of the whole affair was that “of
an Austro-Hungarian punitive expedition against Serbia and the blow that this
would deal, by exposing Russia’s impotence to prevent it, to her standing as a
Great Power, both in the Balkan capitals and in Europe generally.”[256] That Isvolsky and Russia
set out on an ambitious foreign policy to repair her damage in the Japanese war
is puzzling. Gooch explains Russia’s foreign affairs follies in the years
immediately following the humbling in Japan thusly: “Russia … was unfit
for war, and should have kept aloof from the quarrels of the Powers. Her
initial mistake in tying herself to France and thereby needlessly antagonizing
Germany was followed by an endeavor to secure hegemony in the Balkans, which
involved the hostility of Austria.”[257]
Why Russia would risk this kind of damage to
her standing in the world for only the prospect of opening the Bosporus
Straights is also a good question. Isvolsky must have been extremely
overconfident in the prospects of achieving this goal, as all it took was the
casual mention of Austria’s openness to the idea that led him to pursue it with
reckless abandon.
It is important to place the Bosnian
annexation crisis in context of what previously happened in the first Moroccan
crisis and the subsequent conference that resulted in Germany backing down due
to the combined, unwavering pressure of France, Russia, and Britain. Mercer
explores how the fallout from that conflict informed how the participants of
this Balkan crisis would react not three years later. Following Algeciras,
“Germany left … with three lessons: Germany had a reputation for lacking
resolve and other states would seek to exploit it; Germany was alone in the
world except for Austria and so Vienna must be supported; Germany should avoid
conferences when in the minority.”[258]
This accounts for how the German position on a European Conference to settle
the Bosnian affair was so intransigent. One can extend this logic further to
explain how Germany did not believe Russia would mobilize in 1914 to protect
Serbia from Austrian attack.
The systems of alliances that developed
post-Bismarck were expedient and largely untested prior to the first Moroccan
crisis. At Algeciras, the Franco-British Entente
Cordiale was put to the test with Germany experiencing a diplomatic defeat
and sensing the need to strengthen its own ties to Austria-Hungary. The Bosnian
crisis served this purpose fittingly. While Wilhelm was likely furious that he
was not consulted by Austria, he had to have been pleased the crisis occurred
as it did with the strengthening of Austria and the relationship with her. The
overall “result of the crisis was thus to consolidate both alliance systems, to
extend the scope of the German-Austrian one, and to increase the level of
tension between the two.”[259]
“However, by threatening to resist and then backing down, Russia lost far more
than a payoff from the Austrians. The situation in 1909 led others to ignore
later Russian diplomatic statements.”[260]
The British attempt to mediate was doomed
from the outset because she had not nearly as much to gain or to lose as the
other participants. While Britain merely hoped to maintain a delicate and
nascent understanding with Russia and France, Germany viewed her alliance with
Austria-Hungary as an existential one. Germany saw the Triple Entente as an
encirclement of Germany which threatened her interests. Britain saw these
relationships as an opportunity to check the next would-be continental hegemon.
Both Grey and Cambon of France prevaricated
once forced by Ährenthal to call his bluff or fold. Cambon looked to Grey for
the first move, and Grey did likewise.[261] Grey could not lead
effectually from the rear, as France did not have the willingness to confront
Germany’s ally.
To be fair to Grey and the Foreign Office,
precisely because there was a great deal less to lose, there was not much more
that Grey could have done. The major variables in the equation had already been
defined prior to his wading into the crisis. When Isvolsky begged him to step
in, having already seen how important it was to Britain to maintain the
Entente, there was little Grey could have done but give his ascent to the
Russians.
All participants in 1909 walked away with this
mentality of a fear of the loss of prestige. Russia was terrified she would
never be taken seriously in international affairs. Austria-Hungary sensed its
own weakness and susceptibility to being torn apart piece-meal from the inside
by nationalists. France felt threatened by Germany’s industrial and military
might and had good reason to be due to the lessons of 1871. Germany felt
surrounded by large powers, one of which she had offended recently, and the
other which had allied militarily with the first one. Britain felt threatened
as her main claim to being a Great Power, her navy, was on the cusp of being
eclipsed by a new industrial power.
Appendix A – Alliance Structure
Appendix B – Great Powers’ Personalities Visual Aid
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Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War
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[3]
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[4]
Schmitt, 195-198.
[5]
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[6]
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[7]
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Sean McMeekin, The Russian origins of the
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D. W. Sweet, “The Bosnian Crisis,” in British
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[11]
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Albertini, 18-20; Fay, 66.
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Albertini, 21-23; Fay, 67.
[20]
Albertini, 31; Fay, 67.
[21]
Fay, 69.
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Albertini, 36, 37.
[23]
Ibid., 46-50.
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Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War: 1914, Volume 1 (New
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[25]
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George F. Kenan, The Fateful Alliance:
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Albertini, 76, 77.
[29]
Ibid., 96.
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Sontag, 475.
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Fay, 168-169.
[33]
Ibid., 191-192.
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Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914,” The American Historical Review 29, no. 3
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Harold George Nicolson, Sir Arthur
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Constable & Co. Ltd., 1930), 264.
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Ibid.
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Albertini, 190-191.
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Wilhelm E. von Schön, The Memoirs of an
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Constance Vesey, trans. (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD., 1922), 52.
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Fay, 369. Quote from Daily, 55.
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Fay, 367.
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Grey to Nicolson, no. 258, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds, British Documents on the
Origins of the War, 1898-1914,
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[50]
Fay, 369.
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Letter to Baron Ährenthal, November 19, 1907, Von Hötzendorf, 516.
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Albertini, 194.
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[55]
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Nicolson to Grey, no. 241, B.D., vol. V, 345.
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Albertini., 195.
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Ibid., 196, 197.
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Dailey, 57.
[62]
Albertini, 217-218.
[63]
Ibid.
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Alexander Isvolsky, Recollections of a
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[65]
Dailey, 59-61.
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Dailey, 61-62.
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John D. Treadway, The Falcon & the
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Ibid.
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Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
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[70]
Ibid.
[71]
Ibid.
[72]
Ibid., 36.
[73]
Ibid., 20.
[74]
Grey to Lowther, no. 313, B.D., vol. V, 396.
[75]
Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
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Whitehead to Grey, no. 315, B.D., vol. V, 397.
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Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
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Pourtalès to Bülow, no. 9370, Germany Auswärtiges
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Nicolson to Grey, no. 570, B.D., vol. 5, 599.
[82]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 567, B.D., vol. 5, 596.
[83]
Russian Chargé d’Affairs at
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Unsigned Note, Bülow, no. 9330,
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Hardinge, Memorandum, B.D., vol. 5, 609.
[87]
Ibid.
[88]
Ibid.
[89]
Ibid.
[90]
Ibid.
[91]
Von Schön, G.P., no. 9373, 597.
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Von Hötzendorff, 144, 145.
[96]
Hardinge to Nicolson, no. 567, B.D., vol. 5, 597.
[97]
Grey to Nicolson, no. 573, B.D., vol. 5, 601.
[98]
“Viscount Grey of Falladon”, The World’s Work,
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[99]
“Fear was the key to Grey’s principle of foreign policy. Fear was also the key
to the only alteration of the diplomatic landscape that Grey set out to make.
This objective was – an agreement with Russia, and that it was inspired by fear
of Russia is clear.” Keith M. Wilson, “Grey,” in British Foreign Secretaries
and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War, Keith M. Wilson, ed.
(Kent, UK: Croom Helm Ltd., 1987.), 178.
[100]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 585, B.D., vol. 5, 611.
[101]
Isvolsky to the Russian Embassy in London, no. 288, de Siebert, 244.
[102]
Rodd to Grey, no. 593, B.D., vol. 5, 614.
[103]
Bülow to Kaiser Wilhelm, no. 9379, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 603.
[104]
Oswald H. Wedel, Austro-German Diplomatic
Relations: 1908-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), 35.
[105]
Aerenthal to Bülow, no. 9386, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 613, 614.
[106]
Goschen to Grey, no. 615, B.D., vol. 5, 630.
[107]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 592, B.D., vol. 5, 613.
[108]
Ibid.
[109]
Goschen to Grey, no. 596, B.D., vol. 5, 615, 616.
[110]
Ibid.
[111]
Goschen to Grey, no. 598, B.D., vol. 5, 617.
[112]
Ibid., 618.; Nicolson to Grey, no. 600, B.D., vol. 5, 619.;
[113]
Goschen to Grey, no. 598, B.D., vol. 5, 618.
[114]
Ibid.
[115]
Grey to Goschen, no. 599, B.D., vol. 5, 618, 619.
[116]
Note by Kiderlen, no. 9397, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 628, 629.
[117]
Isvolsky to the Russian Minister at Belgrade, February 27 1909, no. 251,
Siebert, 235, 236.
[118]
Grey to Bertie, no. 611, B.D., vol. 5, 627.
[119]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 643, B.D., vol. 5, 650.
[120]
Ibid.
[121]
Grey to Nicolson, no. 629, B.D., vol. 5, 643.
[122]
Bülow to Metternich, no. 9401, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 632.
[123]
Bülow to Metternich, no. 9401, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 632.
[124]
Ibid.
[125]
Sergeyev to Isvolsky, no. 268, Siebert, 242.
[126]
An example includes the first Serbian draft of February 27, the language of
which included references to Austrian press campaigns against Serbia, Grey to
Whitehead, no. 634, B.D., vol. 5, 646. Also, see Grey to Nicolson, no. 656,
B.D., vol. 5, 660, concerning the armaments subject. A further example is the
inclusion of references to potential future territorial claims by Serbia, Grey
to Whitehead, no. 645, B.D., vol. 5, 651.
[127]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 603, B.D., vol. 5, 621.
[128]
Sergeyev to Isvolsky, no. 267, Siebert, 242; Sergeyev to Isvolsky, no. 268,
ibid., 242; Isvolsky to Sergeyev, no. 273, ibid., 246; Isvolsky to Sergeyev,
no. 275, ibid., 247; Isvolsky to Benckendorff, no. 278, ibid., 248; Isvolsky to
Benckendorff, no. 282, ibid., 251; Nicolson to Grey, no. 631, B.D., vol. 5,
644.
[129]
Isvolsky to Benckendorff, no. 279, Siebert., 249; Cartwright to Grey, no. 636,
B.D., vol. 5, 647; Grey to Cartwright, no. 643, B.D., vol. 5, 650; Grey to
Cartwright, no. 659, B.D., vol. 5, 664.
[130]
Nicholson to Grey, no. 646, B.D., vol. 5, 652.
[131]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 649, B.D., vol. 5, 655.
[132]
Von Hötzendorff, 567-571.
[133]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 652., B.D., vol. 5, 656.
[134]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 667, B.D., vol. 5, 669.
[135]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 669, B.D., vol. 5, 670.
[136]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 659, B.D., vol. 5, 663, 664; Kiderlen, private note,
no. 9425, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 652, 653.
[137]
Grouitch to Grey, no. 662, B.D., vol. 5, 666.
[138]
Goschen to Grey, no. 673, B.D., vol. 5, 672.
[139]
Isvolsky to Nelidov, no. 279, Siebert, 249.
[140]
Goschen to Grey, no. 673, B.D., vol. 5, 672.
[141]
Ibid.
[142]
Ibid., 673.
[143]
Ratibor to Bülow, no. 9431,
G.P., vol. 26, part II, 660.
[144]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 667, B.D., vol. 5, 669.
[145]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 659, B.B., vol. 5, 664.
[146]
Whitehead to Grey, no. 683, B.D., vol. 5, 679, 680.
[147]
Whitehead to Grey, no. 686, B.D., vol. 5, 681.
[148]
Szögyény to Bülow, no. 9434, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 662.
[149]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 681, B.D., vol. 5, 678, 679.
[150]
On March 12, Kiderlen told Szögyény that “personally, [he] would hold on to
this trump card as long as possible,” Kiderlen, private note, no. 9425, G.P.,
vol. 26, part II, 652, 653; Pourtalès to Bülow, no. 9436, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 667, 668.
[151]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 682., B.D., vol. 5, 679.
[152]
Bülow to Pourtalés, no. 9437,
G.P., vol. 26, part II, 669, 670.
[153]
Bernhard Bülow, Memoirs of Prince von
Bülow, vol. 2, Franz von Stockhammern, F. A. Voigt, Geoffrey Dunlop, trans
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1931-1932), 447, 448.
[154]
Pourtalés to Bülow, no. 9441, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 673-676.
[155]
Isvolsky to the Russian Embassies at London and Paris, no. 287, Siebert, 255,
256.
[156]
Grey to Nicolson, no. 714, B.D., vol. 5, 702.
[157]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 722, B.D., vol. 5, 708.
[158]
Isvolsky to the Russian Embassies at London and Paris, no. 287, de Siebert,
256.
[159]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 729, B.D., vol. 5, 711-713.
[160]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 660, B.D., vol. 5, 664, 665.
[161]
Pourtalés to Bülow, no. 9326, G.P. vol. 26, part II, 546.
[162]
Bertie to Grey, no. 724, B.D., vol. 5, 709.
[163]
“Arthur Nicolson, 1st Baron Carnock,” December 31, 1920, Public Domain,
accessed April 3, 2015, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/85/Arthur_Nicolson.jpg.
[164]
Pourtalès to Bülow, no. 9458, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 691-692.
[165]
Bülow to Pourtalés, no. 9460, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 694.
[166]
“The Russian Surrender to Germany,” The
Times of London, March 29, 1909, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280556/#129/295280582.
[167]
Grey to Nicolson, no. 782, B.D., vol. 5, 747.
[168]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 793, B.D., vol. 5, 754.
[169]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 785, B.D., vol. 5, 749.
[170]
Grey to Count de Bosdari, no. 846, B.D., 789.
[171]
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and
International Politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 115.
[172]
Fay, 371.
[173]
Russian Foreign Ministry, How the War Began
in 1914: Being the Diary of the Russian Foreign Office from the 3rd
to the 20th (old style) of July, 1914, W. Cyprian Bridge,
trans., (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1925), 23.
[174]
Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions
for War, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37.
[175]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 570, B.D., vol. 5, 599.
[176]
De Siebert, no. 250, 234, 235; Ibid., no. 40, 236; Ibid., no. 41, 236, 237;
Ibid., Letter, March 3, 1909, 238-241; Nicolson to Grey, no. 612, B.D., vol. 5,
628.
[177]
Nelidov to Isvolsky, no. 262, Siebert, 236.
[178]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 644, B.D., vol. 5, 651.
[179]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 613, B.D., vol. 5, 628, 629.
[180]
Isvolsky to Sergeyev, no. 275, Siebert, 247.
[181]
Sergei D. Sazonov, Fateful Years 1909-1916: The Reminiscences of
Serge Sazonov (New York: F.
A. Stokes Company, 1928), 13.
[182]
Benckendorff to Isvolsky, no. 283, Siebert, 252.
[183]
Ibid.
[184]
Nicholson to Grey, no. 701, B.D., vol. 5, 695.
[185]
Grey to Goschen, no. 647, B.D., vol. 5, 653. See also Goschen to Grey no. 668,
B.D., vol. 5, 669, 670, wherein Goschen intimates German opinion on a draft
reply to Austria was shaped only after hearing Vienna’s reaction and once
informed, mirrored Ährenthal’s
identically.
[186]
Goschen to Grey, no. 648, B.D., vol. 5, 654.
[187]
Grey to Nicolson, no. 621., B.D., vol. 5, 637, 638.
[188]
Ibid.
[189]
D. B. Cooper, “British Policy in the Balkans, 1908-9,” The Historical Journal 7, no. 2 (1964), 275, accessed October 28,
2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020354.
[190]
Footnotes to Cartright to Grey, No. 700, B.D., vol. 5, 694.
[191]
Grey to Nicolson, no. 647, B.D., vol. 5, 653.
[192]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 605, vol. 5, 622, 623.
[193]
Nicholson to Grey, no. 701, B.D., vol. 5, 695
[194]
Helene Isvolsky, “The Fateful Years: 1906-1911,” Russian Review 28, no. 2 (April, 1969), 199, accessed October 28,
2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/127507.
[195]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 571, B.D., vol. 5, 600.
[196]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 646, B.D., vol. 5, 652.
[197]
Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 88, B.D., vol. 4, 92; Memorandum by Charles Hardinge
on the Possibility of War, Appendix III, B.D., vol. 5, 823; Nicolson to Grey,
no. 664, B.D., vol. 5, 667.
[198]
Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
1908-1909, 36.
[199]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 576, B.D., vol. 5, 603.
[200]
Nicolson to Grey, no. 664, B.D., vol. 5, 667.
[201]
Grey, 69.
[202]
Grey to Bertie, no. 611, B.D., vol. 5, 627; Nicolson to Grey, no. 619, B.D.,
vol. 5, 636.
[203]
Paul G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval
Situation: 1908-1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 1-2.
[204]
K. G. Robbins, “The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties”
in British Foreign Policy Under Sir
Edward Grey, F. H. Hinsley, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977), 3.
[205]
Grey, 35, 36.
[206]
Ibid., 60.
[207]
Ibid., 32.
[208]
Robbins, 6.
[209]
Grey, 54.
[210]
Hardinge, Memorandum, November 16, 1906, B.D., vol. 4, 58; Marian Kent
“Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905-1914” in British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, 156;
[211]
A good example of this is in Lowther to Grey, no. 708, B.D., 699, in which both
Mallet and Grey give their interpretations on the effect of the
Bulgarian-Russian agreement of March, 1909, to the relations of Turkey to her
neighbors and Britain.
[212]
“Policy of Great Britain,” The Times of
London, October 6, 1908, 5, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295202750.
[213]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 695, B.D., vol. 5, 688; Grey to Nicolson, no. 714,
B.D., vol. 5, 702; Cartwright to Grey, no. 735, B.D., vol. 5, 717; Grey to
Cartwright, no. 741, 720; Grey to Goschen, no. 768, B.D., vol. 5, 739.
[214]
Bernhard von Bülow, “Dynamic Foreign Policy,” Speech to the German Reichstag,
1899, Adam Blauhut, trans., accessed December 1, 2014, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=779
[215]
O’Conor to Grey, no. 147, B.D., vol. 5, 174-177.
[216]
Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France
and Germany,” appendix A, B.D., vol. 3, 405.
[217]
Goschen to Grey, no. 680, B.D., vol. 5, 678.
[218]
Kiderlen, private note, no. 9426, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 652, 653.
[219]
Pourtalès to Bülow, no. 9427,
G.P., vol. 26, part II, 654, 655.
[220]
Von Hintze to Kaiser Wilhelm, no. 9428, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 657.
[221]
Alexander Isvolsky, 3-5.
[222]
Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8,” 59.
[223]
Goschen to Grey, no. 168, B.D., 213.
[224]
Sazonov, 19-20.
[225]
Aerenthal to Bülow, no. 9386, G.P., vol. 26, part II, 612, 613.
[226]
Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
1908-1909, 9.
[227]
Grey to Cartwright, no. 651, B.D., vol. 5, 656.
[228]
Cartwright to Grey, no. 601, 602, B.B., vol. 5, 620, 621.
[229]
Albertini, 73-75.
[230]
Ibid., 76.
[231]
Ibid.
[232]
Bertie to Grey, no. 294, B.D., 386-387.
[233]
French Embassy at St. Petersburg to Imperial Russian Government, no. 257, de
Siebert, 232.
[234]
Grey, 166, 167.
[235]
K. G. Robbins, “Public Opinion, Press and Pressure Groups” in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey,
70-73.
[236]
Ibid., 73.
[237]
“Policy of Great Britain,” The Times of
London, October 6, 1908, 5, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295202979.
[238]
“The Excitement in Serbia,” The Times of
London, October 8, 1908, 5, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295203350.
[239]
“The European Situation,” The Times of
London, December 8, 1908, 5, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/296298970.
[240]
“Austro-Serbian Relations,” The Times of
London, February 24, 1909, 5, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295499845.
[241]
“ German Semi-Official Views,” Ibid.
[242]
“The British Efforts for Peace,” The
Times of London, March 29, 1909, 7, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280582.
[243]
“The Lesson for France and England,” The
Times of London, March 29, 1909, 7, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280582.
[244]
“The Efforts of Germany,” The Times of
London, March 26, 1909, 5, accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280536.
[245]
“Germany and the Situation,” The Times of
London, March 27, 1909, 9, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280560.
[246]
“Reported Resignation of Isvolsky,” The
Times of London, March 30, 1909, 5, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280602.
[247]
“Germany’s Intervention”, The Times of
London, March 27, 1909, 9, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280560.
[248]
“Russia and the German Intervention,” The
Times of London, March 31, 1909, 5, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280624/#129/295280624.
[249]
“Russia and the German ‘Coup,’” The Times
of London, April 1, 1909, 5, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295280624/#129/295492504.
[250]
For example, reference Grey to Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs, no.
348, B.D., 418, and “Sir E. Grey’s Reply to Montenegro,” The Times of London, October 12, 1908, 5, accessed December 2,
2014, http://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/129/295202979/#129/295204267.
[251]
Grey, 42, 43.
[252]
Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
1908-1909, 20.
[253]
Ibid., 36.
[254]
Bridge, 25.
[255] William L. Langer,
“Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League, 1908-1912,”
Political Science Quarterly 43, no. 3
(September 1928), 324, accessed October 30, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2142971.
[256]
Bridge, 24.
[257]
G. P. Gooch, “Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy,” British Institute of International Affairs 2, no. 1 (January 1923),
21.
[258]
Mercer, 130.
[259]
Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no 4 (July 1984),
478.
[260]
Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, “Honest Threats: The Interaction of
Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46,
no. 2 (April 2002), 190.
[261]
Bertie to Grey, no. 783, B.D., 748; “Should Servia refuse to send the note
which we have agreed to join in recommending we should also be prepared to
assent to abrogation of Art[icle] 25 if, as I understand is the case, all the
other Treaty Powers are prepared to do the same,” Grey to Cartwright, no. 786,
B.D., 750.
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